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I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1991 decision of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,' the Supreme
Court enforced an employee's agreement to submit all future claims against his
employer to arbitration rather than litigating the claims in court.' Since then,
employers increasingly require their employees to sign arbitration agreements.3 At
the same time, legal scholars and practitioners debate the merits and demerits of
compulsory employment arbitration.4 On the positive side, arbitration provides a
forum for resolving employment disputes, particularly for those employees with
limited resources whose claims are too questionable or with damages too low to
attract a lawyer willing to take the case on a contingency basis.5 On the negative
side, arbitration's informality makes it an inadequate forum for resolving large,
complex, class-based claims, and the absence of a jury makes arbitration an
inappropriate forum for resolving claims that derive from an employer's violation
of external community values.6 Moreover, several commentators are concemed
with employers' ability to manipulate the arbitration process by drafting one-sided
arbitration agreements.7 In response, the courts, by refusing to enforce such
agreements,8 appear to be in the process of establishing, on a case-by-case basis,
minimum procedural and substantive safeguards.9
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the administrative
agency created by Congress to administer the federal employment discrimination
laws, opposes compulsory employment arbitration. In a 1997 Policy Statement, the
EEOC declared that these arbitration agreements usurp the judicial role of
1. 500 U.S. 20(1991).
2. See id. at 35.
3. See Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV.
83, 100 (1996).
4. See, e.g., RICHARD A. BALES, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION: THE GRAND EXPERIMENT IN
EMPLOYMENT (1997).
5. See id. at 154-59; David Sherwyn et al., In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of Employment
Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing Out the Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink in the Process,
2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73, 89-99 (1999); Ronald Turner, Compulsory Arbitration of Employment
Discrimination Claims with Special Reference to the Three A's-Access, Adjudication, and
Acceptability, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 231, 284 (1996).
6. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals ofEmployment Discrimination Law, 56
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 395,437-39 (1999); Matthew W. Finkin, Modem Manorial Law, INDUS. REL.,
Apr. 1999, at 132-33.
7. See, e.g., Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the
Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 1024-27 (1999); David M. Kinnecome, Note, Where
Procedure Meets Substance: Are Arbitral Procedures a Method of Weakening the Substantive
Protections Afforded By Employment Rights Statutes?, 79 B.U. L. REV. 745, 762-64 (1999).
8. See, e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 941 (4th Cir. 1999); Maciejewski v.
Alpha Sys. Lab., Inc., 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 390, 396 (Ct. App. 1999), review granted and opinion
superseded by 986 P.2d 170 (Cal. 1999).
9. See Finkin, supra note 6, at 132.
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interpreting and applying the federal discrimination laws, thereby limiting civil
rights provided by those laws.' ° The EEOC, in addition to issuing this Policy
Statement, has filed amicus briefs in support of employees attempting to void their
arbitration agreements." The EEOC has also used its prosecutorial powers both
to challenge the validity of arbitration agreements, 12 and to circumvent the effect
of such agreements by litigating, in its own name, the underlying employment
disputes which employees contractually have agreed to arbitrate. 3
This Article examines the EEOC's opposition to compulsory employment
arbitration, and evaluates its likely impact. Part II introduces the EEOC, focusing
on the specific powers Congress has given or denied the agency to enforce the
federal anti-discrimination laws.' Part III provides a brief history and overview
of employment arbitration. 5 Part IV analyzes the EEOC Policy Statement on
employment arbitration, and considers whether and to what extent courts are likely
to defer to it.'6 Part V discusses the EEOC's use of its prosecutorial powers to
challenge and circumvent arbitration agreements, and examines the relevant and
analogous case law.'7 Part VI concludes that neither the EEOC's Policy Statement
nor its litigation efforts are likely to have a substantial effect on the current judicial
trend toward acceptance of employment arbitration agreements.
II. THE EEOC
The EEOC was created 8 by Congress in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 to administer that employment discrimination statute. 9 Congress later
expanded the EEOC's jurisdiction to include claims brought under the Age
10. See EEOC Policy Statement on Mandatory Arbitration, 133 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at E-4
(July 11, 1997) [hereinafter EEOC Policy Statement].
11. See infra notes 312-323 and accompanying text.
12. See infra Part V.A.
13. See infra Part V.B.
14. See infra notes 18-73 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 74-162 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 163-300 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 301-438 and accompanying text.
18. For a detailed history of the EEOC's creation, see ALFRED W. BLUMROSEN, MODERN LAW: THE
LAwTRANsMISSION SYSTEM AND EQUAL EMPLOYMENTOPPORTUNITY 40-92 (1993); Richard K. Berg,
Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 BROOK. L. REV. 62, 62-68
(1964); ArthurEarle Bonfield, The Origin and Development ofAmerican Fair Employment Legislation,
52 IOWA L. REV. 1043, 1048-88 (1967); Michael Selmi, The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining the
Agency's Role in Employment Discrimination Law, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 5-11 (1996); Rebecca Hanner
White, The EEOC, the Courts, and Employment Discrimination Policy: Recognizing the Agency's
Leading Role in Statutory Interpretation, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 51, 60.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1994).
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)2° and the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA).2' Proponents of the bill that eventually became Title VII envisioned
an agency with broad powers to investigate alleged violations of workplace
discrimination and to enforce Title VII requirements against non-compliant
employers.22 These powers originally included the authority to: (1) promulgate
rules and regulations to eliminate ambiguities in the statute and to enforce the
statute's requirements; (2) receive and investigate allegations of employment
discrimination; (3) mediate conflicts between employers and employees regarding
allegations of discrimination; (4) issue "cease-and-desist" orders to compel
employers to stop their discriminatory practices; and (5) file lawsuits in federal
court on behalf of aggrieved employees.23
The first proposed power was to promulgate rules and regulations. When
Congress passed Title VII, it left several important policy issues unanswered,
presumably to avoid contentious debate that might have sidelined passage of the
larger civil rights package of which Title VII was a part.24 Proponents of the
original bill intended the EEOC to resolve these issues by issuing "suitable
regulations" for the enforcement of Title VII. 25 The EEOC's proposed rulemaking
powers received scant attention in the long congressional debate over passage of
Title VII because legislators doubted that the EEOC would exercise its rulemaking
authority to any significant degree.26 This doubt was based on the fact that the
EEOC was originally modeled after the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), 27
the administrative agency created by Congress in 1935 to administer federal law
governing unions. 28 The NLRB, which has full rulemaking authority, 29 traditionally
has chosen to exercise its authority through the adjudication of cases rather than by
substantive rulemaking."° Legislators opposed to the creation of a strong anti-
discrimination enforcement agency, therefore, had no reason to perceive the
EEOC's rulemaking authority as a threat.3
Nonetheless, the EEOC's authority to issue substantive regulations did not
survive the passage of Title VII. 32 Two days before the bill was passed by the
20. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
22. See HUGH D. GRAHAM, THE CtvIL RIGHTs ERA, 133-34 (1990); Berg, supra note 19, at 65.
23. See infra notes 25-74 and accompanying text.
24. See GRAHAM, supra note 22, at 144-47.
25. See H.R. 7152, 88th Cong. § 714(a) (1963).
26. See White, supra note 18, at 60.
27. See GRAHAM, supra note 22, at 148.
28. See White, supra note 18, at 59-60.
29. See 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1994).
30. See Charles J. Morris, The NLRB in the Doghouse-Can an Old Board Learn New Tricks?, 24
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 27-28 (1987). But see Gould Outlines His Agenda for Change as NLRB
Chairman, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at 53 (Mar. 21, 1994) (promising that the NLRB will use substantive
rulemaking more frequently in the future).
31. See White, supra note 18, at 60.
32. See id. at 59-60.
[Vol. 27: 1, 1999] Employment Arbitration
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
House, it was amended to provide that the EEOC's rulemaking authority would be
limited to "procedural regulations."33 This amendment was adopted without
debate, thereby removing the EEOC's authority to promulgate substantive rules.34
In 1966, Nicholas Katzenbach, then Attorney General, directed a task force to
consider amending Title VII to give the EEOC substantive rulemaking power.35
However, Title VII was not amended because the Justice Department felt that "the
federal courts were likely to defer to [the EEOC's] presumed substantive authority
much as they had with ... other established regulatory agencies" even absent
formal substantive rulemaking authority.36 Today, the EEOC still lacks statutory
authority to issue substantive regulations under Title VII, though the agency does
have this power under both the ADA 37 and the ADEA.38
The EEOC's second proposed power was the authority to receive and
investigate allegations of employment discrimination. Title VII contains an
elaborate procedure (one commentator has called it "an administrative obstacle
course"39) that employees must follow before they may sue their employer for an
alleged violation of the statute. One of these procedures-filing a charge of
discrimination-involves notifying the EEOC of employment discrimination in a
sworn written statement.' To preserve the right to bring a lawsuit, an employee
must file a charge within 300 days of the alleged discrimination.4 After receiving
a charge of discrimination, the EEOC may investigate the charge by issuing
subpoenas to compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses or to compel the
production of documents," interviewing the charging party (the employee), one or
more representatives of the employer and relevant witnesses,43 and conducting on-
33. See 110 CONG. REC. H2575 (1964) (statement of Rep. Celler, offeror of the amendment).
34. See id. (Rep. Celler noting no objections to the amendment).
35. See White, supra note 18, at 62.
36. See id.
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 121.16.
38. See 29 U.S.C. § 628.
39. See 1 CHARLES A. SuLLIVAN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 11.2 (2d ed. 1988).
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). The requirement is applicable to employees working in states
(called "deferral" states) that have established a state administrative agency parallel to the EEOC;
employees working in a state that has not established such a parallel agency must file their Title VII
charge within 180 days of the allegedly unlawful act. See id.
42. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.16(a) (1996); see also EEOC v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 26 F.3d 44,47-48
(6th Cir. 1944) (permitting judicial enforcement of an EEOC administrative subpoena if the subpoena
(1) seeks relevant information, (2) is not unduly burdensome, and (3) is within the statutory authority
of the EEOC).
43. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.15(a); see also EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 9810, at 821-32 (discussing
the types and purposes of interviews during employment-related investigation).
site inspections." The EEOC's power to receive and investigate charges survived
the passage of Title VII.
The drafters of Title VII intended one of two things to occur following the
EEOC's investigation of an employment discrimination charge. If the EEOC
determined the charge was unfounded, it would be dismissed. If, however, the
EEOC investigation found reasonable cause to believe that the charge was true, the
charge would be resolved through the informal means of "conference, conciliation,
and persuasion."45 The latter constitutes the third power that Title VII's drafters
initially envisioned for the EEOC. Congress apparently believed that employers,
when confronted with an EEOC finding of discrimination, would meet the
aggrieved employee willingly at a negotiating table presided over by the EEOC,
and that the parties would resolve their disputes amicably and voluntarily with the
aid of the EEOC as conciliator. The EEOC, therefore, was given the power to
attempt "through conciliation and persuasion to resolve disputes involving
employment discrimination charges."46 This reflects Congress' expectation that the
EEOC would be able to dispose of most charges of discrimination without
resorting to litigation.47
Congress did not expect that all allegations of discrimination would be settled
this way, and therefore permitted employees to sue the employer on their own
behalf. Title VII explicitly permits employees to sue their employers after the
employees have received a "right-to-sue" letter4" from the EEOC, informing them
that the EEOC has exhausted both its investigation and its efforts to achieve
voluntary compliance. 9
44. Compare Motorola, Inc. v. McLean, 484 F.2d 1339, 1346 (7th Cir. 1973) (upholding the
EEOC's right to conduct an on-site inspection), with EEOC v. Maryland Club Corp., 785 F.2d 471,475
n.2 (4th Cir. 1986) (noting the district court's refusal to enforce a subpoena demand by the EEOC to
tour an employer's facility).
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
46. See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII
AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 3284 (1968) (statement of Rep. Celler)[hereinafter EEOC,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
47. See, e.g., Wheeldon v. Monon Corp., 946 F.2d 533,535-36 (7th Cir. 1991); Marrero-Rivera v.
Department of Justice, 800 F. Supp. 1024, 1028-29 (D.P.R. 1992), aff'd, 36 F.3d 1089 (1st Cir. 1994);
Johnson-McCray v. Board of Educ., 44 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1145, 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); see also
Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co., 773 F.2d 857, 863-64 (7th Cir. 1985) ("[Alllowing a complaint to
encompass allegations outside the ambit of the predicate EEOC charge would circumvent the EEOC's
investigatory and conciliatory role.., as surely would an initial failure to file a timely EEOC charge.");
Dickey v. Greene, 710 F.2d 1003, 1006 (4th Cir. 1983) (noting that a plaintiff's failure to specifically
list her former supervisor as a respondent in her EEOC charge was fatal to her suit against the
supervisor because it did not give the EEOC an opportunity to investigate and conciliate the allegations
made against the supervisor).
48. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601 .28(a)(1) (noting that an employment discrimination claimant can request
a notice of right-to-sue 180 days after filing a charge of discrimination).
49. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (describing procedures for filing a court claim); Occidental Life
Ins. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 361 (1977) (noting that a "complainant whose charge is not dismissed or
promptly settled or litigated" may bring a lawsuit only at the termination of the EEOC's exclusive
jurisdiction); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798-99 (1973) (discussing
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As originally drafted, Title VII would have given the EEOC two enforcement
powers in addition to the enforcement power created by the individual employee's
right to file suit.50 Both of these additional powers would have arisen only after the
EEOC found "reasonable cause" to believe that a statutory violation had occurred.
First, Title VII would have permitted the EEOC to issue a "cease-and-desist" order
to compel an employer to stop its discriminatory practices." Second, Title VII
would have given the EEOC authority to file a lawsuit in federal court on behalf
of the aggrieved employee. 2
The first enforcement power-the power to issue "cease-and-desist"
orders-was hotly contested in the congressional debates preceding the passage of
Title VII. 3 Opponents of the bill, fearful of creating a civil rights enforcement
agency that could investigate and prosecute as well adjudicate employers' liability,
fought hard to limit what they viewed as the potentially unchecked power of the
EEOC.' As a result, the House version of Title VII did not provide the EEOC
with the power to issue "cease-and-desist" orders,55 but retained the EEOC' s power
to prosecute violations by bringing suit on behalf of aggrieved employees. 6 The
version of the bill that became law did not authorize the EEOC to issue "cease-and-
desist" orders. 7 In 1972, Congress attempted unsuccessfully to give the EEOC the
authority to issue such orders.5
The EEOC's second proposed enforcement power-the prosecution
power-was removed from the bill shortly before passage as part of a last minute
compromise. 9 As the Senate was debating the bill, a bipartisan group of its
prerequisites to filing a discrimination lawsuit).
50. See GRAHAM, supra note 22, at 146-52.
51. See id. at 129-47.
52. See Berg, supra note 18, at 67, 85-88.
53. See GRAHAM, supra note 22, at 129-47.
54. See Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. &COM. L. REV. 431,450-51
(1966) (referring to the "fear that the EEOC would develop into another expensive octopus like the
NLRB").
55. See EEOC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 46, at 2043, 2057. As indicated by Honorable
William McCulloch of the House Committee on the Judiciary, "[a] substantial number of committee
members... preferred that the ultimate determination of discrimination rest with the Federal judiciary.
Through this requirement... settlement of complaints w[ould] occur more rapidly and with greater
frequency. In addition . . . the employer or labor union w[ould] have a fairer forum to establish
innocence .... See id. at 2122, 2150.
56. See id. at 2029.
57. See GRAHAM, supra note 22, at 133-34; Berg, supra note 18, at 65; White, supra note 18, at
59-60.
58. See STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 92D
CONG., 2D SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACroF 1972,141 -
47, 251-314, 1557 (Comm. Print 1972).
59. See EEOC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 46, at 10-11, 3003-04.
supporters worked with the Department of Justice and key House members to draft
a pair of substitute amendments to help ensure passage.6" These amendments
limited the EEOC's enforcement power to seek conciliation.6
Because of the absence of any real enforcement authority, the EEOC, for most
of the first decade of its existence, was perceived as "toothless," 62 and a "poor-
enfeebled thing"63 as compared to other administrative agencies. 64 To correct this
situation,65 Congress reinstated the EEOC's prosecutorial power as part of the 1972
Equal Employment Opportunity Act amendments66 to Title VII, giving the EEOC
authority to sue employers for violations of the statute.67 During the time between
the filing of a charge and the issuance of a right-to-sue letter, the EEOC retains
exclusive jurisdiction over the claim. 6 Should the EEOC sue the employer at that
60. See 110 CONG. REC. 11, 926 (1964) (quoting amendment number 656); 110 CONG. REC. 13,
310 (1964) (quoting amendment number 1052).
61. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1988) (originally codified as 42 U.S.C. § 706(e) (1970)) (providing
that the failure of conciliation efforts would terminate the EEOC's involvement in the case and would
enable the charging party to bring a private cause of action in federal court within thirty days after
EEOC notification that conciliation efforts had failed). A staff member of the Senate Judiciary
Committee summarized the change as follows:
The Senate amendment struck out the power of the [EEOC] to enforce this title of the bill in
court suits .... Its function now is limited to an attempt at voluntary conciliation of alleged
unlawful practices .... Under the Senate amendment only an aggrieved person can bring suit
against an employer unless there is a pattern or practice of resistance .... The Commission
cannot institute suit at all.
Vaas, supra note 54, at 452 (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 13, 331 (1964)).
62. See GRAHAM, supra note 22, at 157-59, 235-36.
63. MICHAEL I. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 205
(1966).
64. The EEOC's reputation has not improved substantially over the years. See, e.g., Selmi, supra
note 18, at 64 (describing the EEOC as "a failure, serving in some instances as little more than an
administrative obstacle to resolution of claims on the merits").
65. The purpose of the change was explained in a Senate report as follows:
The accomplishment of the stated purpose of Title VII, the elimination of employment
discrimination in all areas of employment in this Nation, has not been accomplished under the
present system of voluntary compliance through EEOC procedures or, in the alternative, the
private lawsuit. Under the provisions of section 4 of the bill, the overriding public interest in
equal employment opportunity would be asserted through direct Federal enforcement.
4 LEx K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 75.01, at 75-2 (2d ed. 1995); see also H.R. REP.
No. 92-238, at 3 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2139 ("[T]he machinery created by the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 [was] not adequate" because the "voluntary approach ... failed to eliminate
employment discrimination."). "[E]ffective enforcement procedures [must] be provided the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission to strengthen its efforts to reduce discrimination in
employment." 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2144. "In cases posing the most profound consequences,
[employers had] more often than not shrugged off the [EEOC's] entreaties and relied upon the
unlikelihood of the parties suing them." S. REP. No. 92-415, at 4 (1971). The "failure to grant the
EEOC meaningful enforcement powers [was] a major flaw in the operation of Title VII." Id.
66. Congress also gave the EEOC the authority to pursue "pattern and practice" cases, a power
previously held by the Attorney General's office. See White, supra note 18, at 66.
67. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4.
68. See General Tel. Co. of the North-West, Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 324 (1980).
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time, the employee is barred from litigating the claim against the employer, though
she has the right to intervene in the EEOC's action.69 If the EEOC persuades the
facffinder that the employer has intentionally engaged in unlawful discrimination,
the court may order injunctive relief and such remedies as reinstatement or hiring
of employees, backpay, and compensatory and punitive damages.7"
The efficacy of the EEOC's prosecutorial power, however, is significantly
constrained by the EEOC's chronic lack of funds. The resultant backlog of cases
and shortage of staff permits the EEOC to file suit in only a small percentage of the
cases it considers.71
The EEOC, therefore, has the power to investigate allegations of employment
discrimination and to attempt to conciliate them. Although it has the power to sue
employers to enforce the anti-discrimination laws, this power is limited by its
inadequate funding. The EEOC also has the power to issue procedural, but not
substantive regulations under Title VII, though the EEOC has authority to issue
both types of regulations under the ADA and-ADEA.72 The EEOC does not have
the power to issue "cease-and-desist" orders; it may only obtain prospective
injunctive relief by using its prosecutorial power to file suit in federal court.73
69. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
70. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a(a)(1), 2000e-5(g)(1).
71. See William M. Howard,Arbitrating Claims of Employment Discrimination: WhatReallyDoes
Happen? What Really Should Happen?, 50 Disp. RESOL. J. 40, 45 (1995); see also Selmi, supra note
18, at 16, 21 (noting that the EEOC receives approximately 90,000 charges of discrimination per year,
but only files approximately 350 substantive lawsuits involving a total of approximately 450 allegations
of discrimination).
72. See White, supra note 18, at 58, 89-96.
73. See supra notes 54-72 and accompanying text.
II. THE ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY EMPLOYMENT CLAIMS
The evolution of the Supreme Court's treatment of employment arbitration has
been extensively chronicled in the legal literature,7" and therefore will be recounted
here only in a concise summary.
A. The Early Years of Statutory Arbitration
At common law, an arbitration agreement could be revoked by either party at
any time before the arbitrator issued an award.75 The Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA), enacted in 1925,76 and recodified in 1947,77 changed this by requiring
courts to enforce arbitration agreements made in connection with commerce and
maritime transactions.78 Section 2 of the FAA provides that arbitration agreements
"shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law
74. See, e.g., Mark L. Adams, Compulsory Arbitration of Discrimination Claims and the Civil
Rights Act of 1991: Encouraged or Proscribed?, 44 WAYNE L. REV. 1619 (1999); Roberto L. Corrada,
The Arbitral Imperative in Labor and Employment Law, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 919 (1998); Samuel
Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344
(1997); David E. Feller, Compulsory Arbitration of Statutory Discrimination Claims Under a
Collective Bargaining Agreement: The Odd Case of Caesar Wright, 16 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMPL. L. J.
53 (1998); David E. Feller, Fender Bender or Train Wreck?: The Collision Between Statutory
Protection of Individual Employee Rights and the Judicial Revision of the Federal Arbitration Act, 41
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 561 (1997); Andrea Fitz, The Debate Over Mandatory Arbitration in Employment
Disputes, 54 Disp. RESOL. J. 35 (1999); Paul H. Haagen, New Wineskins for New Wine: The Need to
Encourage Fairness in Mandatory Arbitration, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1039 (1998); Theodore J. St. Antoine,
Mandatory Arbitration of Employee Discrimination Claims: Unmitigated Evil or Blessing in
Disguise?, 15 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 1 (1998); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect
Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS.
L. REV. 33; Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through
Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703 (1999); Miriam A. Cherry, Note, Not-So-Arbitrary Arbitration:
Using Title VII Disparate Impact Analysis to Invalidate Employment Contracts that Discriminate, 21
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 267 (1998); Anthony J. Jacob, Comment, Expanding Judicial Review to
Encourage Employers and Employees to Enter the Arbitration Arena, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1099
(1997); Lynne M. Longtin, Comment, The EEOC's Position on Mandatory Arbitration, 67 U. CIN. L.
REV. 265 (1998); Patrick A. Lynd, Comment, Recent Developments Regarding Mandatory Arbitration
of Statutory Employment Disputes, 77 OR. L. REV. 287 (1998); Donna Meredith Matthews, Note,
Employment Law After Gilmer: Compulsory Arbitration of Statutory Antidiscrimination Rights, 18
BERKELEY J. EMPL. & LAB. L. 347 (1997); John-Paul Motley, Note, Compulsory Arbitration
Agreements in Employment Contracts from Gardner-Denver to Austin: The Legal Uncertainty and
Why Employers Should Choose Not to Use Preemployment Arbitration Agreements, 51 VAND. L. REV.
687 (1998); Amy L. Ray, Comment, When Employers Litigate to Arbitrate: New Standards of
Enforcement for Employer Mandated Arbitration Agreements, 51 SMU L. REV. 441 (1998).
75. See, e.g., Vynior's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 595 (K.B. 1609); Kill v. Hollister, 95 Eng. Rep. 532
(K.B. 1746); Oregon & W. Mortgage Sav. Bank v. American Mortgage Co., 35 F. 22 (C.C. Or. 1888);
Allen v. Watson, 16 Johns 205; Jones v. Harris, 59 Miss. 214 (1981).
76. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994) (original version at 43 Stat. 883 (1925)).
77. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
78. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16.
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or in equity for the revocation of any contract."79 Section 3 permits a party to an
arbitration agreement to obtain a stay of proceedings in federal court when an issue
is referable to arbitration.8" Section 4 permits such a party to obtain an order
compelling arbitration when another party has failed, neglected, or refused to
comply with an arbitration agreement, and also authorizes judicial enforcement of
arbitration awards."1
Notwithstanding the FAA, the Supreme Court, in the 1953 decision of Wilko
v. Swan,82 held that a buyer of securities who had sued the seller claiming fraud in
violation of Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933,83 could not be compelled
to arbitrate the claim despite the existence of an arbitration clause in the sales
contract." The Court voided the arbitration clause as an invalid waiver of the
substantive law created by the statute.85 Lower federal courts subsequently
interpreted Wilko as creating a defense to the enforcement of arbitration agreements
under the FAA when statutory claims were at issue.86 This defense was premised
on the assumptions that: (I) courts could enforce statutory rights better than
arbitrators; (2) it contravened public policy to permit a party to waive her statutory
right to a judicial forum by signing a predispute arbitration agreement; and (3) the
informality of arbitration made it difficult for courts to correct arbitral errors in
statutory interpretation.87
B. The Steelworkers Trilogy
While lower federal courts, under the authority of Wilko, were proclaiming the
inferiority of arbitration for resolving statutory claims, the Supreme Court strongly
endorsed arbitration as a mechanism for resolving industrial disputes arising under
collective bargaining agreements.88 In these cases, decided in 1960 and known
79. See id. § 2.
80. See id. § 3.
81. See id. § 4.
82. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1994).
84. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438.
85. See id. at 430-35.
86. See G. Richard Shell, The Role of Public Law in Private Dispute Resolution: Reflections on
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 26 AM. Bus. L.J. 397, 404 (1988); Michael G.
Holcomb, Note, The Demise of the FAA's "Contract of Employment" Exception ?, 1992 J. DISP. RESOL.
213,216.
87. See, e.g., American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827 (2d Cir.
1968); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 444 F. Supp. 68, 70-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
88. See Susan A. FitzGibbon, Reflections on Gilmer and Cole, 1 EMPLOYEE RIGHTS& EMPL. POL'Y
J. 221, 222 (1997).
collectively as the Steelworkers Trilogy,89 the Court ignored the FAA and relied
instead on section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act.9" The holdings of
the Trilogy were that arbitrators, not courts, are to decide the arbitrability of
grievances;9' that courts should refuse to order arbitration only if the arbitration
clause "is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute";92
and that courts should not review the merits of an arbitration award so long as the
award "draws its essence" from the collective bargaining agreement.93
The Steelworkers Trilogy did not overrule Wilko, but instead distinguished it
on the basis that the Steelworkers cases arose in the unique context of the collective
bargaining relationship.9" Whereas the alternative to arbitrating statutory claims
was judicial resolution of those claims "with established procedures or even special
statutory safeguards,"95 the alternative to arbitrating claims arising out of a
collective bargaining relationship was, according to the Court, "industrial strife."96
Thus, the Steelworkers cases were predicated on the Court's fear of labor unrest, 97
a fear not applicable to the statutory cases that, until 1974, did not arise in the
employment context.
Because the Court distinguished rather than overruled Wilko, the twin products
of the Steelworkers Trilogy-a virtually irrebuttable presumption of arbitrability
and a sharply limited role for the courts-applied only to arbitration agreements
contained in collective bargaining agreements.98 After the Trilogy, lower federal
courts continued to apply Wilko to statutory claims,99 thus dividing arbitrable
collective bargaining issues from nonarbitrable statutory ones. This division was
challenged by the 1974 case of Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. "o
89. United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers
of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
90. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1994).
91. See American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 567-68.
92. See Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 582-83.
93. See Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597.
94. See Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 578.
95. See id.
96. See id.; see also David E. Feller, Arbitration and the External Law Revisited, 37 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 973, 974 (1993) ("Arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement, unlike commercial
arbitration, was not an alternative forum for determining issues which would otherwise be litigated, but
was developed as a substitute for the strike.").
97. Note the similarity between the Supreme Court's justification for the Steelworkers Trilogy-fear
of"industrial strife"-and its justification for the section 301 preemption doctrine-necessity of promoting
"industrial peace."
98. See Samuel Estreicher, Arbitration of Employment Disputes Without Unions, 66 CHI.-KENTL.
REV. 753,758 (1990).
99. See, e.g., Romyn v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 648 F. Supp. 626, 632 (D. Utah 1986)
(RICO); Breyer v. First Nat'l Monetary Corp., 548 F. Supp. 955, 959 (D.N.J. 1982) (Commodities
Exchange Act); Aimcee Wholesale Corp. v. Tomar Prods., Inc., 237 N.E.2d 223, 225 (N.Y. 1968)
(Sherman Antitrust Act).
100. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
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C. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.
Gardner-Denver presented the issue of whether an employer could require an
employee to arbitrate a statutory employment discrimination claim pursuant to the
arbitration provisions of his collective bargaining agreement."' ° The plaintiff,
ostensibly discharged for producing too many defective parts, 102 testified at the
arbitration hearing that he had been fired because of his race.0 3 The arbitrator
ruled for the employer. " The plaintiff then filed a Title VII discrimination suit in
federal court. 5 The district court granted summary judgment for the employer,
finding that the discrimination claim had been submitted to and resolved by the
arbitrator."0 The Tenth Circuit affirmed.'07
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that an employee does not forfeit his
Title VII discrimination claim by first pursuing a grievance to final arbitration
under the nondiscrimination clause of a collective bargaining agreement.' The
Court presented four reasons why labor arbitration was inappropriate for the final
resolution of Title VII claims. First, the Court stated that labor arbitrators lack both
the experience and the authority to resolve Title VII claims." The "specialized
competence of arbitrators," the Court noted, "pertains primarily to the law of the
shop, not the law of the land."" 0 Second, the Court noted the relative informality
of arbitration hearings as compared to judicial proceedings, and concluded that
arbitral factfinding procedures were inadequate to protect employees' Title VII
rights."' Third, the Court pointed out that arbitrators are under no obligation to
issue written opinions."2 Finally, the Court noted the union's exclusive control
over the manner and extent to which an employee's grievance is presented.' The
101. Seeid. at38.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 38, 42.
104. See id. at 42.
105. See id. at 39, 42-43.
106. See id. at 43.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 49-50.
109. See id. at 57.
110. See id.
111. See id. at 56-58. But cf. FRANK ELKOURI &EDNA A. ELKOURI, HOWARBITRATION WORKS 376
(4th ed. 1985) ("Courts aren't right more often than arbitrators and the parties because they are wiser.
They are right because they have the final say.") (quoting James E. Westbrook, The End of an Era in
Arbitration: Where Can You Go if You Can't Go Home Again? (1980)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
112. See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 58.
113. Seeid.at58n.19.
Court was concerned that a union's duty to represent employees collectively might
interfere with its pursuit of an individual employee's claim."4
The Steelworkers Trilogy and Gardner-Denver seemed to stand for the
proposition that arbitration was an appropriate mechanism for resolving issues
arising under the "law of the shop, ' '" but was not appropriate for resolving issues
arising under the "law of the land.""' 6 Following this reasoning, several lower
courts ruled that arbitration clauses contained in individual employment contracts,
instead of in collective bargaining agreements, would not preclude subsequent suits
under anti-discrimination laws.' 1'
D. The Mitsubishi Trilogy
While post-Gardner-Denver decisions in the lower courts refused to compel
arbitration of statutory claims in the employment context, the Supreme Court issued
three decisions approving arbitration of statutory claims arising under antitrust," 8
securities,' 19 and racketeering 2 ' laws. In these cases, collectively known as the
Mitsubishi Trilogy, the Court interpreted the FAA as creating a presumption that
statutory claims are arbitrable, and made this presumption rebuttable only upon a
showing by the party opposing arbitration that Congress specifically intended
114. See id.
115. See RichardA. Bales, The DiscordBetween Collective Bargaining and Individual Employment
Rights: Theoretical Origins and a Proposed Solution, 77 B.U.L. REv. 687,726 (1997); see also John
Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964) (stating that a collective bargaining
agreement "calls into being... the common law of a particular industry or of a particular plant.")
(quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,578-79 (1959)).
116. See Bales, supra note 115 at 726.
117. See, e.g., Utley v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184, 187 (1st Cir. 1989) (Title VI);
Nicholson v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 877 F.2d 221, 227-28 (3d Cir. 1989) (ADEA); Swenson v. Management
Recruiters Int'l, Inc., 858 F.2d 1304, 1307 (8th Cir. 1988) (Title VI1); Jones v. Baskin Flaherty, Elliot
& Mannino, P.C., 661 F. Supp. 597, 604 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (ADEA); Steck v. Smith Barney, Harris
Upham & Co., 661 F. Supp. 543, 544-47 (D.N.J. 1987) (ADEA); Home v. New England Patriots
Football Club, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 465,467-70 (D. Mass. 1980) (ADEA). But see Pihl v. Thompson
McKinnon Sec., 48 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 922, 924-26 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (holding that ADEA
claims are subject to compulsory arbitration).
118. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 640 (1985)
(compelling enforcement of a private contract to arbitrate claims arising under the Sherman Antitrust
Act).
119. See Rodriguez deQuijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,479,484-85 (1989)
(compelling enforcement of a private contract to arbitrate claims arising under section 12(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933).
120. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,238,242 (1987) (compelling
enforcement of a private contract to arbitrate claims arising under both RICO and section 10(b) of the
Securities Act of 1934).
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otherwise. 121 Moreover, the Court explicitly rejected arguments questioning the
competence of arbitrators and the sufficiency of arbitral procedures.
122
The Court predicated this new presumption of arbitrability on two assump-
tions, both of which were a marked departure from prior precedent. The first was
that an arbitration agreement involves no waiver of substantive rights:
By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forego the substantive
rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather
than a judicial, forum. It trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the
courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration. 23
The second assumption was that arbitrators are capable of deciding complex
statutory issues. Noting that the parties may appoint arbitrators with particular
statutory expertise and that the arbitrator or the parties may employ experts, the
Court concluded that "we are well past the time when judicial suspicion of the
desirability of arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the
development of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution." 124 On
this basis, the Court expressly overruled Wilko.2 5
The Mitsubishi Trilogy represented a transformation of the Supreme Court's
attitude toward arbitration outside the union context. Before the Mitsubishi
Trilogy, statutory claims were not arbitrable; afterward, they were arbitrable so
long as they did not arise in the employment setting. It was in this context that the
Court granted certiorari in a case raising the issue of the arbitrability of statutory
employment claims
E. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.'26
The Gilmer decision precipitated the recent prevalence of employment
arbitration agreements.127 Robert Gilmer was discharged from his job as manager
121. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226; Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628 (citation omitted).
122. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 232 ("[T]he streamlined procedures of arbitration do not entail any
consequential restriction on substantive rights."); Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628.
123. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628.
124. See id. at 626-27. The "well past" language seems hyperbolic, given that just one year before,
in McDonald, the Court had stated that an arbitrator may lack the competence required to resolve the
complex legal issues involved in a section 1983 action. See McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466
U.S. 284, 284-85 (1984).
125. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc, 490 U.S. 477, 483-84 (1989).
126. 500U.S.20(1991).
127. See Richard A. Bales, Creating and Challenging Compulsory Arbitration Agreements, 13 THE
LAB. LAW. 511, 511 (1998).
of financial services at Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.'28 Subsequently, he filed a
civil suit, alleging that he had been fired because of his age in violation of the
ADEA.'29 The employer moved to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration
agreement contained in Gilmer's registration agreement with the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE), in which Gilmer had "agree[d] to arbitrate any dispute, claim,
or controversy" between him and his employer "arising out of the employment or
termination of [his] employment."'' 31The Supreme Court granted the motion, and ordered Gilmer to arbitration. 13 1
In doing so, the Court rejected four broad arguments supporting Gilmer's claim
that the arbitration clause should not preclude his ADEA suit: first, that an arbitral
forum is inadequate to protect an employee's statutory employment rights;
132
second, that arbitration is inconsistent with the statutory purposes and framework
of the ADEA; 133 third, that an FAA provision excluding "contracts of employment"
rendered the FAA inapplicable; 134 and fourth, that Gardner-Denver stood for the
proposition that an employee could not be required to arbitrate his statutory
claims.'35
First, the Court rejected Gilmer's claim that the arbitral forum was inadequate
to protect his statutory employment rights, noting that the Mitsubishi Trilogy had
rejected this argument as "'far out of step with our current strong endorsement"'
of arbitration. 136 Gilmer further attacked arbitral adequacy on the ground that
arbitral discovery was more limited than that available through federal courts.
37
The Court, noting that NYSE rules permitted "document production, information
requests, depositions, and subpoenas,"' 13' declared that "by agreeing to arbitrate, a
party 'trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the
simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.""1
39
As a separate attack on arbitral adequacy, Gilmer pointed out that arbitrators
are not required to issue written opinions. 4 ° This, he argued, would reduce public
accountability for employer discrimination, hamper effective judicial review, and
stifle development of the law. The Court responded with three arguments. "' First,
128. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
129. See id.
130. See id. (quoting Respondent's Brief at 1, 18).
131. See id. at 35.
132. See id. at 30.
133. See id. at 29, 33.
134. See id. at 25.
135. See id. at 33.
136. See id. at 30 (quoting Rodriquez de Quijas v. ShearsonAmerican Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,
481 (1989)).
137. Seeid.at31.
138. See id.
139. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985)).
140. See id.
141. See id.
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the Court asserted, incorrectly, that NYSE arbitration rules require arbitrators to
issue written opinions.142 The Court reasoned that courts would continue to issue
judicial opinions in employment discrimination cases because not all employers
and employees are likely to sign binding arbitration agreements. '43 The Court noted
that settlement agreements, which are encouraged by the ADEA, similarly fail to
produce written opinions. 44
Second, the Court rejected Gilmer' s argument that arbitration was inconsistent
with the statutory purposes and framework of the ADEA, and that this inconsis-
tency rebutted the presumption of arbitrability created by the Mitsubishi Trilogy. 145
To this, the Court responded that the arbitral forum was consistent with the ADEA
and adequate to protect the statute's important social policies, that nothing in the
ADEA evinced congressional intent to preclude arbitration with sufficient clarity
to rebut the Mitsubishi presumption, and that arbitration agreements in the
employment setting would not be voided merely because they were entered into
under conditions of unequal bargaining power between employers and
employees.'4 6 The Court also rejected Gilmer's argument that arbitration would
undermine the role of the EEOC in enforcing the ADEA by not requiring
employees to file a charge of discrimination before arbitrating their claims.147 The
Court responded that an arbitration agreement would not preclude an employee
from filing an EEOC charge, and that the agreement therefore would not
necessarily exclude the EEOC from the dispute resolution process.
148
142. See id. at 31-32. NYSE rules require only that the arbitrator issue a written award, which does
little more than state who shall receive what and when the individual will receive it. See Uniform
Arbitration Act § 8-16, 7 U.L.A. 207-08 (1994); see also GEORGE GOLDBERG, A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 57-60 (2d ed. 1983) (describing the procedures and content of an
arbitration award). The arbitrator is not required to issue an opinion giving reasons for the award. See
Reginald Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination Claims: Rights "Waived" and Lost in the Arbitration
Forum, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 381, 413 (1996); Peter M. Mundheim, Comment, The Desirability of
Punitive Damages in Securities Arbitration: Challenges Facing the Industry Regulators in the Wake
of Mastrobuono, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 197, 202 (1995).
143. See Gilmer 500 U.S. at 32.
144. See id.
145. See id. at 32-33.
146. See id. at 33.
147. See id. at 28.
148. The Court stated that inability to file a private judicial action would not prevent an employee
from filing a charge with the EEOC. See id. The Court further stated that the EEOC's role in fighting
discrimination was not dependent on individual employees filing a charge. See id. First, the EEOC can
investigate claims even when a charge is not filed. See id. The Court also asserted that "nothing in the
ADEA indicates that Congress intended that the EEOC be involved in all employment disputes." See
id. Finally, the Court, citing the Securities Exchange Commission's involvement in enforcing securities
statutes, stated that the mere involvement of an administrative agency in the enforcement of a statute
does not preclude compulsory arbitration. See id. at 28-29.
Third, the Court rejected the argument of several amici curiae that an FAA
provision excluding "contracts of employment" rendered the FAA and its
presumption of arbitrability inapplicable to Gilmer's case. The Court concluded
that because the arbitration agreement was contained in Gilmer's registration
application with the NYSE, it was not part of the "contract of employment" with
his employer.'49
Fourth, the Court distinguished the Gardner-Denver decision from Gilmer's
case in three ways. 15 ° First, the Court noted that unlike a labor arbitrator whose
authority is limited to interpreting the collective bargaining agreement at issue, 5'
the arbitrator deciding Gilmer's case would be given explicit authority to resolve
"any dispute, claim or controversy" arising out of Gilmer's employment.'52
Second, the Court pointed out that Gilmer-unlike the plaintiff in
Gardner-Denver-was not dependent on a union to enforce his statutory claims.'53
Third, noting that Gardner-Denver was not decided under the FAA,'54 the Court
applied the statute and the Mitsubishi presumption of arbitrability to the employ-
ment context of Gilmer.
155
Gilmer left several issues unresolved. For example, by sidestepping the
"contracts of employment" provision in the FAA, the Court left open the possibility
that Gilmer would apply only to employees in the securities industry whose
arbitration agreement is contained in their registration application with the
NYSE.'56 Most lower courts, however, have interpreted the clause narrowly to
exclude only those workers involved directly in interstate commerce, such as truck
drivers.'57 Similarly, on its face, Gilmer applies only to ADEA claims, but lower
149. The Court also noted that Gilmer had not presented, and the courts below had not considered,
the effect of this provision on Gilmer's case. See id. at 25 n.2.
150. See id. at 33-35.
151. See id. at 34.
152. See id. at 23, 35.
153. See id. at 35.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See Slawsky v. True Form Founds. Corp., No. 91-1882, 1991 WL 98906, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June
4, 1991).
157. See, e.g., McWillians v. Logicon, Inc., 143 F.3d 573, 575 (10th Cir. 1998); Rojas v. TK
Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 747-48 (5th Cir. 1996); Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71
F.3d 592,596-602 (6th Cir. 1995). But see Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 161 F.3d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir.
1998) (interpreting clause as excluding all labor and employment contracts), amended and superseded
on denial of reh 'g by 177 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999). One commentator, after exhaustively canvassing
the statute's legislative history, agreed with the Gilmer dissent that the exclusion was intended broadly
to preclude application of the FAA to any employment relationship. See Matthew W. Finkin,
Employment Contracts Under the FAA--Reconsidered, 48 LAB. L.J. 329, 329-35 (1997); Matthew W.
Finkin, "Workers' Contracts" Under the United States Arbitration Act: An Essay in Historical
Clarification, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 282, 290 (1996). But see Estreicher, supra note 74, at
1344, 1363-72 (predicting that the Supreme Court will interpret the exclusion narrowly).
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courts have compelled arbitration of claims arising under Title VII,'s other federal
anti-discrimination statutes,'59 state anti-discrimination law," and state common
law.' It therefore appears that, at least until the Supreme Court revisits these
issues, compulsory arbitration is firmly entrenched in the employment landscape. 62
IV. THE EEOC POLICY STATEMENT
On July 10, 1997, the EEOC issued a Policy Statement declaring its opposition
to compulsory employment arbitration agreements. 163 This Policy Statement, and
the effect it is likely to have on judicial decisions concerning the enforcement of
employment arbitration agreements, is discussed in Part IV.A. below."6 It is an
open issue, however, whether and to what extent courts will defer to the Policy
Statement. Part IV.B. examines the general Chevron principles under which courts
defer to the policy promulgations of administrative agencies. 165 Part IV.C. applies
these general principles of deference to the EEOC's Policy Statement.16
6
Historically, the Supreme Court has used a different set of principles to determine
158. See, e.g., Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts., Inc., 167 F.3d 361, 362 (7th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, No. 98-1778, 1999 WL 296951, at *1 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1999); Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc.,
146 F.3d 175, 182-83 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1028 (1999); Bender v. A.G. Edwards
& Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698, 700-01 (11 th Cir. 1992); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d
305,307 (6th Cir. 1991); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 229-30 (5th Cir. 1991).
But see Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1188 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
445 (1998) (noting that the language and legislative history of Title VII and the Civil Rights Act of
1991 evince congressional intent that claims brought under that statute not be subject to compelled
arbitration).
159. See, e.g., Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875,881-82 (4th Cir. 1996)
(Americans with Disabilities Act); Kuehner v. Dickinson & Co., 84 F.3d 316, 318-20 (9th Cir. 1996)
(Fair Labor Standards Act); Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110, 1112
(3d Cir. 1993) (Employee Retirement Income Security Act); Saari v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham &
Co., 968 F.2d 877, 881-82 (9th Cir. 1992), (Employee Polygraph Protection Act); Reese v. Commercial
Credit Corp., 955 F. Supp. 567,570 (D.S.C. 1997) (Family Medical Leave Act); Topf v. Warnaco, Inc.,
942 F. Supp. 762, 764 (D. Conn. 1996) (Rehabilitation Act of 1973); Kinnebrew v. Gulf Ins. Co., CA
No. 3:94-CV-1517-R, 1994 WL 803508, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 28, 1994) (Equal Pay Act); William v.
Katten, Muchin & Zavis, 837 F. Supp. 1430, 1437 (N.D. III. 1993) (42 U.S.C. § 1981).
160. See, e.g., Willis, 948 F.2d at 308 (applying FAA to cause of action brought under Kentucky
statute prohibiting gender discrimination).
161. See, e.g., Bender, 971 F.2d at 699 (compelling arbitration of common law claims of battery,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent retention).
162. See BALES, supra note 4, at 169.
163. See EEOC Policy Statement, supra note 10.
164. See infra notes 169-218 and accompanying text.
165. See infra notes 219-235 and accompanying text.
166. See infra notes 236-266 and accompanying text.
the degree to which it defers to the EEOC. Part IV.D. reviews these principles, 67
and Part IV.E. applies them to the EEOC Policy Statement. 6 '
A. Description
The EEOC does not oppose employment arbitration wholesale. The Policy
Statement affirms the Commission's "strong support of voluntary alternative
dispute resolution programs that resolve employment discrimination disputes in a
fair and credible manner, and are entered into after a dispute has arisen."'69 The
EEOC does not, however, support predispute agreements imposed by the employer
as a condition of empl6yment. 7 °
The EEOC Policy Statement provides eight reasons for which the Commission
opposes compulsory employment arbitration agreements.' 7' Some of these reasons
have been explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court in the Mitsubishi and Gilmer
decisions. Some have been resolved or at least addressed in lower court decisions.
Others present good policy arguments for opposing arbitration. The following is
a discussion of the EEOC's eight reasons, following the order in which they are
raised in the Policy Statement.
First, the EEOC argues that arbitration agreements inhibit the ability of courts
to create precedent.'72 This may be true, but as the Supreme Court pointed out in
Gilmer, not all employers and employees are likely to sign arbitration
agreements.'73 Moreover, settlement agreements, like arbitration agreements, tend
to reduce judicial opinion writing, but are not any less encouraged. '74 Indeed, as
discussed in Part II, one of the primary reasons Congress created the EEOC was
to induce settlement.
75
Second, the EEOC argues that because arbitral decisions are not regularly
reported or otherwise made publicly available, the decisions lack the deterrent
effect of a highly-publicized damage award.'76 "Publicity from employment cases
167. See infra notes 267-293 and accompanying text.
168. See infra notes 294-300 and accompanying text.
169. See EEOC Policy Statement, supra note 10.
170. See id.
171. See generally Beth M. Primm, Comment, A Critical Look at the EEOC's Policy Against
Mandatory Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMPL. L. 151, 163-68 (1999)
(arguing that thejustifications provided by the EEOC against the enforcement of mandatory arbitration
agreements are unsubstantiated and questionable).
172. See EEOC Policy Statement, supra note 10; see also Moohr, supra note 6, at 432-37 (arguing
that arbitrators may stifle the development of the law because they lack legal training and expertise, and
are not accountable to Congress or the public for their decisions).
173. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991). Of course, the incidence
of arbitration will rise as arbitration agreements become more widely enforced.
174. See id.
175. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
176. See EEOC Policy Statement, supra note 10; see also Mundheim, supra note 142, at 203
(discussing arbitration in the securities industry).
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. . .discourages publicity-conscious employers from engaging in unlawful
behavior.""' Publicity also "educates both employers and employees about what
is, and what is not, legal behavior in the workplace."'' 78 "Every case reported in the
popular media reminds employees that they have certain rights that society
considers important, that employers are required to respect, and for which the law
provides a remedy . . . ""'9 Again, however, settlement agreements, strongly
favored under Title VII, equally provide employers with a method of avoiding
publicity regarding their wrongdoing.
Third, the EEOC points out that judicial review of arbitral decisions is
extremely limited, making it difficult for courts to correct arbitrator errors in
statutory interpretation.180 This is true; courts applying the FAA have consistently
stated that they will not reverse an arbitrator's award based on the mere fact that
the arbitrator incorrectly interpreted or applied the law,' 8' but will reverse only if
the arbitrator acted in "manifest disregard of the law"'12 -a standard that requires
the losing party to show that "the arbitrator 'understood and correctly stated the law
177. BALES, supra note 4, at 168; see Moohr, supra note 6, at 432-37.
178. BALES, supra note 4, at 168.
179. Id.
180. See EEOC Policy Statement, supra note 10.
181. See, e.g., DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 822 (2d Cir. 1997) (refusing
to vacate arbitral award despite arbitrators' failure to award attorney's fees as required by statute; "there
[was] no persuasive evidence that the arbitrators actually knew of--and intentionally disregarded--the
mandatory aspect of the [statute's fee-shifting] provision."); Gingiss Int'l, Inc. v. Bormet, 58 F.3d 328,
333 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that appellate review of arbiter's opinion is not allowed under the FAA);
Ainsworth v. Skurnick, 960 F.2d 939, 940 (11 th Cir. 1992) (discussing the court's ability to vacate an
arbitration award); Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679, 683 (1 lth Cir. 1992) (considering whether "manifest
disregard of the law" is a proper basis for vacating an arbitration award); National R.R. Passenger Corp.
v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 551 F.2d 136, 143 (7th Cir. 1977) (stating that arbitration awards will
not be vacated if arbitrators misinterpret the law); Republic of Korea v. New York Navigation Co., Inc.,
469 F.2d 377, 380 (2d Cir. 1972) (stating that the case did not provide any grounds for vacation
because the arbitrators did not exhibit "manifest disregard of the law"); Regina M. Lyons, Testamentary
Trust v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 302,302 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (denying trust's motion
to vacate arbitration award).
182. The "manifest disregard of the law" standard was first mentioned in dictum by the Supreme
Court in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427,436-37 (1953). The Court in Wilko recognized that courts have
limited power to vacate arbitration awards, but stated that:
[w]hile it may be true . . * that a failure of the arbitrators to decide in accordance with
[applicable law] would constitute grounds for vacating the award pursuant to Section 10 of the
Federal Arbitration Act, that failure would need to be made clearly to appear .... [T]he
interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject,
in the federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
but proceeded to ignore it."" 3  The Supreme Court answered in Gilmer that
"although judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards necessarily is limited, such review
is sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply with the requirements of the
statute." ''  However, many commentators, 185 and at least one court, 186 have argued
for an expanded review of cases involving statutory claims.
183. See Siegel v. Titan Indus. Corp., 779 F.2d 891, 892-93 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting Bell Aerospace
Co. Div. of Textron, Inc. v. Local 516, 356 F. Supp. 354, 356 (W.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd on other
grounds, 500 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1974)); see also Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-37 (stating that arbitrators are
not subject to judicial review for errors in interpretation); DiRussa, 121 F.3d at 821-22 (stating that
"manifest disregard" means more than error or misunderstanding); Prudential Bache Sec., Inc. v.
Tanner, 72 F.3d 234, 239 (1 st Cir. 1995) (stating that arbitration awards are reviewable where it is clear
that the arbitrator recognized, but then ignored, governing law); Health Servs. Management Corp. v.
Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253, 1267 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that to vacate an arbitration award for manifest
disregard of the law, "it must be demonstrated that the majority of arbitrators deliberately disregarded
what they knew to be the law in order to reach the result they did"); Marshall v. Green Giant Co., 942
F.2d 539, 550 (8th Cir. 1991) (stating that although the arbitrator may have erred in applying offensive
collateral estoppel, there was no "manifest disregard" of the law); Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d
6,9 (1st Cir. 1990) (finding that brokerage house failed to show that arbitrators manifestly disregarded
the law when they ordered restoration as part of the remedy for wrongful liquidation of investor's
holdings); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986)
(stating that "disregard" implies that the arbitrator decided to ignore a clearly governing legal principle);
San Martine Compania de Navegacion v. Saguenay Terminals, Ltd., 293 F.2d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 1961)
(stating that "manifest disregard of the law must be something beyond and different from a mere error
in the law or failure on the part of the arbitrators to understand or apply the law"). But see R.M. Perez
& Assoc., Inc. v. Welch, 960 F.2d 534, 539 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that "this circuit never has employed
a 'manifest disregard of the law' standard in reviewing arbitration awards").
184. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991).
185. See, e.g., Feller, supra note 96, at 982-83; Moohr, supra note 6, at 447-56; Stone, supra note
7, at 1026-27; Jacob, supra note 74, at 1102; Monica J. Washington, Note, Compulsory Arbitration of
Statutory Employment Disputes: Judicial Review Without Judicial Reformation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV.
844, 847 (1999). But see Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance of the Law Is No Excuse: Judicial
Review of Arbitration Awards, 45 BuFF. L. REv. 49, 123-25 (1997) (arguing that the intent of
contracting parties should control).
186. See Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1487 (D.C. Cir. 1997). After noting the
pronouncements in Gilmer that "'by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forego the
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than
ajudicial, forum"' and that 'although judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards necessarily is limited, such
review is sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply with the requirements of the statute[,]"' the circuit
court concluded that "[t]hese twin assumptions regarding the arbitration of statutory claims are valid
only if judicial review under the 'manifest disregard of the law' standard is sufficiently rigorous to
ensure that arbitrators have properly interpreted and applied statutory law." See id. (quoting Gilmer,
500 U.S. at 26, 32 n.4). Additionally, the court stated that a higher standard of review would not
significantly undermine the finality of arbitration because most employment discrimination claims
center on factual, rather than legal, disputes. See id.; see also Chisolm v. Kidder, Peabody Asset
Management, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 218, 222-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), affd, 164 F.3d 617 (2d Cir. 1998)
(discussing whether the "manifest disregard" standard should be applied differently for claims asserting
statutory rights, but deciding that the factual nature of the dispute made resolution of that issue
unnecessary).
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Fourth, the EEOC opposes compulsory arbitration because it involves a waiver
by employees of their right to trial by jury.8 7 As Professor Matthew Finkin points
out, arbitration is more than capable of resolving disputed facts, such as determin-
ing credibility, and applying those facts to contractual or legal standards,'88 such
as the burden-shifting paradigms of employment discrimination claims. '89 However,
arbitration is not as well-suited to the adjudication of claims that derive from an
employers' violation of external community values,"9° such as claims predicated on
invasion of privacy191 or the creation of a hostile work environment.'92
Fifth, the EEOC points out that discovery in arbitration is limited compared to
discovery that is available in litigation.'93 Restrictions on discovery fall hardest on
employees because the employer already possesses most of the relevant informa-
tion such as personnel files and employee demographic information.' 94 Without
discovery, proving disparate treatment 195 is difficult because a plaintiff bringing
such a case must prove that she was treated differently than other similarly situated
non-class members; 96 she therefore must discover evidence of how those non-class
187. See EEOC Policy Statement, supra note 10. It may be worth noting, however, that employment
discrimination claims were not tried by juries until the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
188. See Finkin, supra note 6, at 132-33.
189. See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993) (discussing the burden-
shifting approach to disparate treatment cases),
190. See Finkin, supra note 6, at 132-33.
191. See, e.g., K-Mart Corp. Store No. 7441 v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632, 636 (Tex. App. 1984)
(discussing invasions of workplace privacy).
192. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22-23 (1993) (discussing the factors which
should be used to determine the existence of a hostile work environment).
193. See EEOC Policy Statement, supra note 10.
194. See Cynthia L. Estlund, WrongfulDischarge Protections in an At-Will World, 74 TEx. L. REV.
1655, 1670 (1996); Robert A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbitration of Public-
Law Disputes, 4 U. ILL. L. REV. 635,661-62 (1995); Schwartz, supra note 75, at 60; Turner, supra note
6, at 289; see also Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers and Financial
Institutions: A Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 267, 283-84
(1995) (emphasizing the importance of discovery to consumers when they are arbitrating claims against
a company); Jean R. Stemlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's
Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 683-84 (1996) (same).
195. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56 (1981) (describing
the allocation of the burden of proof in disparate treatment cases).
196. See Christine G. Cooper, Where Are We Going with Gilmer? Some Ruminations on the
Arbitration of Discrimination Claims, 11 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 203, 218 (1992); see also St.
Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1993) (discussing plaintiffs burden of proof);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (specifying the elements the plaintiff
must prove to establish a primafacie case of racial discrimination).
members were treated.'97 Proving disparate impact19 is impossible.99 without
obtaining from an employer statistical information about how the employment
practice in question affects different demographic segments of the employee
population.2"
The Gilmer court, after noting the availability under NYSE arbitration rules
of document production, information requests, depositions, and subpoenas, 20'
replied that this is simply part of the tradeoff for the employee who agrees to
arbitrate." 2 Generally, lower courts have responded to unreasonable restrictions
on discovery by refusing to enforce the offending arbitration agreement. 23
Nonetheless, most courts seem to agree with the Gilmer Court that discovery
should be less available in arbitration than litigation.20' This is a net disadvantage
to employees, and a valid reason for concern about compulsory arbitration.
Sixth, the EEOC argues, as have several commentators,2 5 that the employer's
unique' status as a repeat player in arbitration gives employers two distinct
advantages. First, the employer is likely to have more and better information about
197. See Cooper, supra note 196, at 218.
198. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971) (holding that employers are
prohibited from requiring a high school education or a standardized general intelligence test as a
condition of employment).
199. See Cooper, supra note 196, at 218.
200. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642,650-51 (1989) ("It is such a comparison
between the racial composition of the qualified persons in the labor market and the persons holding at-
issue jobs that generally forms the proper basis for the initial inquiry in a disparate-impact case.").
201. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991).
202. See id. (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985)).
203. See, e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 39 F. Supp. 2d 582,614-15 (D.S.C. 1998), afftd, 173
F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999). But see Pony Express Courier Corp. v. Morris, 921 S.W.2d 817, 822 (Tex.
App. 1996) (holding that an arbitration clause prohibiting discovery was not unconscionable on its face,
but remanding for a factual determination of whether the arbitration agreement as a whole was
unconscionable).
204. See, e.g., Williams v. Katten, Muchin, & Zavis, 837 F. Supp. 1430, 1439 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
205. See, e.g., Alleyne, supra note 142, at 426; Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The
Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMPLOYEE RIGHTS & EMPL. POL'Y J. 189, 192-93 (1997); Lisa B. Bingham,
On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment
Arbitration Awards, 29 McGEORGE L. REV. 223, 241 (1998); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and
Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement of ExecutoryArbitration Agreements Between Employers
and Employees, 64 U. Mo. KAN. CITY L. REV. 449, 476-79 (1996); Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of
Employment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine and Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14 HOFsTRA LAB.
L.J. 1, 43-44 (1996); Dennis 0. Lynch, Conceptualizing Forum Selection as a "Public Good": A
Response to Professor Stone, 73 DENY. U. L. REV. 1071, 1073 (1996); Schwartz, supra note 75, at 60-
61. On the importance of bilateral repeat player status in the context of labor arbitration, see Bernard
D. Meltzer, Ruminations About Ideology, Law, and Labor Arbitration, PROC. OF THE 20TH ANN.
MEETING OF THE NAT'L ACAD. OF ARB. 1, 3-4 (1997); Julius G. Getman, Labor Arbitration and
Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 916, 929-30 (1979).
206. In traditional labor arbitration between an employer and a union, both parties participate in
arbitration with equal frequency. In employment arbitration, however, the employer alone is a repeat
player, because the employee is unlikely to participate in arbitration more than once or twice in his or
her entire lifetime.
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proposed arbitrators, allowing the employer to choose an arbitrator who is
favorable to the employer." 7 Second, knowledge that the employer is far more
likely than the employee to need an arbitrator for successive cases may, con-
sciously or subconsciously, influence the arbitrator's decision in a case.20 8 Though
courts have not been persuaded to deny enforcement on these grounds,"° they
present a valid concern.1 0
Seventh, the EEOC Policy Statement expresses concern that employers-the
most powerful party to the arbitration agreement--create the terms of the
arbitration agreement, and frequently skew those terms in their favor.2"' The case
law abounds with examples of employers exercising their superior bargaining
power by, for example, limiting an employee's ability to recover punitive or other
21223types of damages, imposing undue restrictions on discovery,213 creating an
arbitrator selection process that encourages arbitrator bias," 4 and drafting one-sided
procedural rules. 5 However, courts generally refuse to enforce arbitration
agreements that are obviously one-sided.2"6
Eighth, the EEOC argues that compulsory arbitration would undermine the role
of the EEOC in enforcing the anti-discrimination laws because employees would
not be required to file charges with the EEOC before proceeding to arbitration. 2'7
The Gilmer Court, however, flatly rejected this argument, reasoning that because
an arbitration agreement would not preclude an employee from filing an EEOC
charge, the agreement would not necessarily shut the EEOC out of the dispute
207. See EEOC Policy Statement, supra note 10.
208. See id.
209. See, e.g., Saari v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham &Co., 968 F.2d 877,882 (9th Cir. 1992); Olson
v. American Arbitration Ass'n, Inc., 876 F. Supp. 850, 852 (N.D. Tex.), affd, 71 F.3d 877 (5th Cir.
1995).
210. For an exploration of conflicts of interest generated by payment of fees by an interested party
in another context, see generally Timothy S. Hall, Third-Party Payor Conflicts ofInterest in Managed
Care: A Proposalfor Regulation Based on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 29 SETON HALL
L. REv. 95 (1998).
211. See EEOC Policy Statement, supra note 10.
212. See, e.g., Paladino v. Avnet Computer Technologies, Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1057-58 (11 th Cir.
1998); Graham Oil Co. v. Arco Products Co., 43 F.3d 1244, 1246 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Trumbull
v. Century Mktg. Corp., 12 F. Supp. 2d 683,686 (N.D. Ohio 1998) ("Because the arbitration procedure
proposed by the defendant would limit the remedies available to the plaintiff under Title VII, it is not
an acceptable replacement for a judicial forum.").
213. See, e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 39 F. Supp. 2d 582, 614 (D.S.C. 1998), affd, 173
F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999).
214. See Hooters, 173 F.3d at 940.
215. See id. at 939.
216. See Richard A. Bales, Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Claims: A Practical Guide to
Designing and Implementing Enforceable Agreements, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 591, 595 (1995).
217. See EEOC Policy Statement, supra note 10.
resolution process."'
Some of the EEOC's policy arguments against compulsory employment
arbitration are more persuasive than others. Some of the arguments have already
been rejected by the courts; other arguments have persuaded courts to refuse to
enforce arbitration agreements in specific cases because the agreements appeared
unfair to employees in some way. The remainder of this Part considers whether
courts are likely to defer to the EEOC's general pronouncement in its Policy
Statement that compulsory employment arbitration agreements should never be
enforced.
B. General Principles of Deference
As many commentators have noted, judicial deference to rules and policy
promulgations by administrative agencies comes in all shapes and sizes.219 At one
extreme, the reviewing court treats an agency's opinion with only as much
deference as it would the opinion of an expert or litigant.22 At the other extreme,
the reviewing court adopts and applies a reasonable agency opinion with which the
court disagrees.22
In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,222 the
Supreme Court announced a two-part test for determining the validity of an
administrative agency's statutory construction:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly
218. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991) (stating that the inability
to file a private judicial action would not prevent an employee from filing a charge with the EEOC).
The Court further stated that the EEOC's role in fighting discrimination was not dependent on
individual employees filing a charge. See id. First, the EEOC can investigate claims even when a
charge is not filed. See id. The Court also asserted that "nothing in the ADEA indicates that Congress
intended that the EEOC be involved in all employment disputes." See id. Finally, the Court, citing the
Securities Exchange Commission's involvement in enforcing securities statutes, stated that the mere
involvement of an administrative agency in the enforcement of a statute does not preclude compulsory
arbitration. See id.
219. See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Pena, 44 F.3d 437, 445 (7th Cir. 1994)
(Easterbrook, J., concurring), aff'd sub nom, Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Atchison, Topeka
& Santa Fe Ry. Co., 516 U.S. 152 (1996); Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and
Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 379-80 (1986); Clark Byse, Scope of Judicial Review in Informal
Rulemaking, 33 ADMIN. L. REV. 183, 191 (1981); Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the
Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 565-67 (1985).
220. See Ronald M. Levin, Judicial Review and the Uncertain Appeal of Certainty on Appeal, 44
DUKEL.J. 1081, 1084 (1995).
221. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Public Employees' Relations Bd., 485 U.S. 589, 603-04
(1988) (White, J., concurring); Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368,383 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring);
Pattern Makers League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 117 (1985) (White, J., concurring).
222. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administra-
tive interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on
a permissible construction of the statute.2" 3
From the outset, Chevron was heralded by lower courts2 4 and legal commenta-
tors2 . as a bold move in favor of greater judicial deference toward administrative
agencies.226 Recently, however, two problems have arisen with this vision. The
first is that, empirically, the Court has given no more deference to agency
interpretations after Chevron than the Court had given before Chevron.2" The
second is that each of the two steps has proven highly malleable,22 able to justify
different outcomes in the same case.229 For example, Justice Stevens would have
courts play an active role in determining congressional intent under Chevron step
one,230 and would consider legislative history23' and traditional tools of statutory
construction; 212 whereas Justice Scalia would limit courts to examining the
statutory text.23 3 For these reasons, several commentators have concluded that
although Chevron provides a consistent framework for judicial review of agency
223. Id. at 842-43 (footnotes omitted).
224. See, e.g., Population Inst. v. McPherson, 797 F.2d 1062, 1069-70 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
225. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283
(1986).
226. See Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1253, 1256 (1997).
227. See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 983
(1992); Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q.
351, 358-60 (1994); see also Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and
Indeterminacy in Substantive Review ofAdministrative Decisions, 44 DuKE L.J. 1051, 1070-71 (noting
the failure of the lower courts to give greater deference to administrative decision-making in the post-
Chevron era).
228. See Mark Burge, Note, Regulatory Reform and the Chevron Doctrine: Can Congress Force
Better Decisionmaking By Courts and Agencies?, 75 Tx. L. REV. 1085, 1097-1103 (1997); Levin,
supra note 226, at 1262.
229. See Burge, supra note 228, at 1097-1103 (discussing Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities for a Greater Oregon, 515 U.S. 667 (1995)).
230. See Burge, supra note 228, at 1097.
231. See Bank One Chicago v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 276 (1996) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
232. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,446 (1987).
233. See Bank One Chicago, 516 U.S. at 279 (Scalia, J., concurring).
actions,23 4 it is not a particularly good predictor of whether courts are likely to defer
to an agency in a given case.235
C. Chevron Deference and the EEOC Policy Statement
Step one of the Chevron analysis asks whether Congress has already spoken
to the question at issue. The question here, then, is whether the federal anti-
discrimination statutes are ambiguous regarding the enforceability of compulsory
employment arbitration agreements.
In Gilmer, the plaintiff argued that compulsory arbitration was inconsistent
with the statutory framework and the purposes of the ADEA.236 The Court flatly
rejected the argument.237 Quoting Mitsubishi, the Court first responded that "if
Congress intended the substantive protection afforded [by the ADEA] to include
protection against waiver of the right to a judicial forum, that intention will be
deducible from text or legislative history."23 The Court then cited two ADEA
provisions which, the Court concluded, suggested that arbitration was consistent
with the statutory framework: the statutory direction to the EEOC to pursue
"informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion, 239 and the statutory
grant of concurrent jurisdiction over ADEA claims to state and federal courts.24
Regarding the latter, the Court quoted a case from the Mitsubishi Trilogy for the
proposition that arbitration agreements, "like the provision for concurrent
jurisdiction, serve to advance the objective of allowing [claimants) a broader right
to select the forum for resolving disputes, whether it be judicial or otherwise.""24
Consistent with the Supreme Court's reasoning in Gilmer, all circuit courts that
have considered the issue, except the Ninth Circuit, have concluded that compul-
sory arbitration is not inconsistent with the other federal anti-discrimination
statutes.
242
It is true, of course, that nothing in the ADEA explicitly forbids compulsory
arbitration. This is hardly surprising, because the ADEA was enacted in 1967, at
a time when Wilko rendered arbitration agreements unenforceable as to statutory
claims, and the Court's enthusiasm for arbitration was confined to collective
bargaining agreements. The Court's citations to ADEA provisions are not any
more persuasive. A preference for post-dispute settlement in no way indicates
234. See, e.g., Levin, supra note 226, at 1259; Burge, supra note 228, at 1103.
235. See, e.g., Burge, supra note 228, at 1089; Note, A Pragmatic Approach to Chevron, 11 2HARV.
L. REV. 1723, 1723-24 (1999).
236. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27 (1991).
237. See id.
238. See id. at 29.
239. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b).
240. See id. § 626(c)(1).
241. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 29 (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,
490 U.S. 477, 483 (1989)).
242. See supra notes 156-62 and accompanying text.
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acquiescence for a pre-dispute arbitration agreement, 24n particularly when other
statutory provisions explicitly provide for jury trials. 2' Similarly, a congressional
preference that an ADEA litigant have access to multiple judicial fora does not
indicate congressional acquiescence to an arbitral forum. 245
Of course, the question the Gilmer Court addressed-whether compulsory
arbitration is inconsistent with the anti-discrimination statutes-is different from
the Chevron question of whether the statutes are ambiguous regarding compulsory
arbitration. A statute that is silent on an issue may at the same time be both
ambiguous and not inconsistent with that issue. Therefore, even accepting the
Court's conclusion that compulsory arbitration is not inconsistent with the ADEA,
it does not necessarily follow that there is no ambiguity.
Several commentators have recently argued that Congress settled the issue by
enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991246 ("Civil Rights Act"). Section 118 of the
Civil Rights Act amended the major federal anti-discrimination statutes, including
Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA.247 It provides that "[w]here appropriate and
to the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute resolution,
including settlement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, factfinding,
mini-trials, and arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under the Acts
or provisions of Federal law amended by this Title. 248 One might argue that this
provision, by endorsing alternative dispute resolution generally and arbitration in
particular, also endorses arbitration that is the product of a pre-dispute arbitration
agreement.249 On the other hand, the forms of alternative dispute resolution listed
in the statute are traditionally agreed to only after a dispute has arisen, and one
might infer from this that Congress did not intend to endorse pre-dispute arbitration
agreements.
243. See Cooper, supra note 198, at 222.
244. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2).
245. See Karen Halverson, Arbitration and the CivilRights Act ofl991, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 445,472
(1999); G. Richard Shell, ERISA and Other Federal Employment Statutes: When is Commercial
Arbitration an "Adequate Substitute"for the Courts?, 68 TEx. L. REV. 509, 568-69 (1990).
246. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
247. See Halverson, supra note 245, at 446 n. 13.
248. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1081.
249. See John A. Gray, Have the Foxes Become the Guardians of the Chickens? The Post-Gilmer
Status of Predispute Mandatory Arbitration as a Condition of Employment, 37 VILL. L. REV. 113, 131
n.64 (1992); see also DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 401, 405
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding no evidence in Title Vl's legislative history or the Civil Rights Act of 1991
that Congress intended to preclude the arbitrability of claims under Title VII); Todd H. Thomas, Using
Arbitration to Avoid Litigation, 44 LAB. L.J. 3, 14 (1993) (arguing that the Civil Rights Act of 1991
provides "another source of authority" for compelling arbitration of statutory claims); White,supra note
19, at 71 ("The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Gilmer decision portend the widespread future use of
arbitration to resolve employment discrimination claims.").
The legislative history of the Civil Rights Act cuts both ways. Interpretive
memoranda placed in the record by Senator Robert Dole and Representative Henry
Hyde state in identical language their support for compulsory arbitration:
This provision encourages the use of alternative means of dispute resolution,
including binding arbitration, where the parties knowingly and voluntarily elect to
use these methods. In light of the litigation crisis facing this country and the
increasing sophistication and reliability of alternatives to litigation, there is no
reason to disfavor the use of such forums. 250
Both memoranda cite Gilmer with approval. Another point that at least marginally
supports the proposition that Congress intended to endorse compulsory arbitration
is the failure of post-Gilmer attempts to legislatively overrule Gilmer or to limit
Gilmer to ADEA cases.25'
However, other sections of the legislative history indicate that Congress may
not have intended to permit compulsory arbitration. Using identical language, the
House Committee on Education and Labor and the House Committee on the
Judiciary, describing the purpose of section. 118 of the Civil Rights Act, stated that:
The Committee emphasizes, however, that the use of alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms is intended to supplement, not supplant, the remedies provided by Title
VII. Thus, for example, the Committee believes that any agreement to submit
disputed issues to arbitration, whether in the context of a collective bargaining
agreement or in an employment contract, does not preclude the affected person from
seeking relief under the enforcement provisions of Title VII. This view is consistent
with the Supreme Court's interpretation of Title VII in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). The Committee does not intend for the inclusion of this
section to be used to preclude rights and remedies that would otherwise be
available. 252
Moreover, the Republican version of the Civil Rights Act, proposed by
President Bush and introduced as an amendment in the nature of a substitute,253
would have encouraged the use of arbitration "'in place of judicial resolution.' 2 54
Noting that this proposal would allow employers to "refuse to hire workers unless
they signed a binding statement waiving all rights to file Title VII complaints," the
House Committee on Education and Labor rejected it, stating:
250. 137 CONG. REC. H9505-01, at H9548 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991).
251. For a discussion of post-Gilmer legislative attempts to restrain compulsory employment
arbitration, see generally Bryan K. Van Engen, Note, Post Gilmer Development in Mandatory
Arbitration: The Expansion of Mandatory Arbitration for Statutory Claims and the Congressional
Effort to Reverse the Trend, 21 J. CORP. L. 391 (1996).
252. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, at 97 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 635.
253. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 97-98 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 635-36.
254. See id. at 104, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 642.
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Such a rule would fly in the face of Supreme Court decisions holding that workers
have the right to go to court, rather than being forced into compulsory arbitration,
to resolve important statutory and constitutional rights, including employment
opportunity rights. American workers should not be forced to choose between their
jobs and their civil rights.255
The conflicting legislative history, together with the failure of the statutory text
to address pre-dispute arbitration specifically, creates ambiguity256 sufficient to
satisfy the first step of the Chevron test.
The second step of the Chevron test requires the court to determine whether
the agency's interpretation is "based on a permissible construction of the
statute. '257  Nothing in the anti-discrimination statutes explicitly endorse
compulsory arbitration; the only provision that even comes close is section 118 of
the 1991 Civil Rights Act which, as discussed above, is far from conclusive.25 The
legislative history discussed above is similarly inconclusive.259 It therefore appears
that step two of the Chevron test is satisfied.
Because both steps of the Chevron test are satisfied, it appears the EEOC
position that compulsory arbitration is inconsistent with the anti-discrimination
statutes is entitled to judicial deference.2' The anti-discrimination statutes,
however, are not the only statutes relevant to a judicial determination of
arbitrability. The statutory basis for the Supreme Court's Gilmer decision was the
FAA, a statute over which the EEOC has no interpretive authority.26 Therefore,
the EEOC cannot assert a narrow interpretation of the Mitsubishi presumption of
arbitrability, or that the FAA should be applied only to commercial agreements, or
that the "contracts of employment" exclusion should be interpreted broadly to
exclude all employment contracts.2 6 2 Moreover, should the Court decide that the
proper approach is to balance the Title VII provisions giving employment
discrimination plaintiffs the right to ajury trial263 against the FAA policy favoring
arbitration,264 as at least one commentator has suggested,265 then the EEOC can only
255. See id. (citations omitted).
256. See BALES, supra note 4, at 53; Halverson, supra note 245, at 448.
257. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,843 (1984).
258. See supra notes 246-49 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 250-56 and accompanying text.
260. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
261. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991); BALES, supra note 4, at
87-88.
262. See BALES, supra note 4, at 88.
263. See Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 363 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Tractor
Supply Co. v. Pryner, 118 S. Ct. 294 (1997).
264. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
265. See, e.g., Halverson, supra note 245, at 448.
speak to one side of this equation. Therefore, courts are unlikely to give
unqualified deference to the EEOC Policy Statement on arbitration based on
Chevron deference alone.266
D. Principles of Judicial Deference to the EEOC
Historically, the Supreme Court has given varying degrees of deference to the
EEOC 7.2 6 In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,268 the Court gave "great deference" to the
EEOC's guidelines permitting only "job-related tests" to serve as employment
prerequisites.269 As a result, the Court invalidated an employer's practice of
requiring intelligence tests and a high school diploma, which bore no relationship
to the job, but resulted in fewer blacks being hired or promoted.270
In Aibemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,271 the Court adhered to this great deference
policy when it used criteria contained in EEOC guidelines to determine that a
particular set of employment tests were not job related.272 The Court noted,
however, that the EEOC guidelines at issue were not "administrative 'regulations'
promulgated pursuant to formal procedures established by the Congress. '273 By
this, the Court meant that the EEOC had not given notice of the proposed
guidelines and an opportunity for the public to comment on them before the
guidelines took effect, as is required of notice and comment rules issued by
agencies under section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act.274 Justice Burger,
concurring and dissenting in Albemarle, stated that for this reason the EEOC
guidelines deserved less deference from the courts than the more formal regulations
promulgated by other agencies.275
In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,276 the Court put a brake on its great
deference policy. In Gilbert, the issue was whether Title VII's prohibition of sex
discrimination also prohibited pregnancy discrimination. 277 The EEOC had issued
interpretive guidelines indicating that Title VII prohibited pregnancy discrimina-
tion.27' The Court not only disagreed, but also belittled the guidelines.279
According to the Court, since Congress in Title VII had given the EEOC the
authority to issue procedural but not substantive rules, its substantive guidelines
266. See Longtin, supra note 74, at 291.
267. See Halverson, supra note 245, at 472.
268. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
269. See id. at 433-34.
270. See id. at 436.
271. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
272. Seeid. at431.
273. See id.
274. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994).
275. See Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 452 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
276. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
277. See id. at 127-28.
278. See id. at 140-41 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1975)).
279. See id. at 142.
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were merely interpretive rules entitled to "less weight" from the reviewing court.280
Justice Brennan, dissenting, cited Griggs and Albemarle in support of the
proposition that EEOC guidelines were entitled to great deference, and accused the
majority of abandoning this precedent.28'
Gilbert seemed to stand for the proposition that the Court would be more
willing to defer to the EEOC's procedural rules than to the agency's substantive
rules. Consistent with this approach, the Court deferred to the EEOC in EEOC v.
Commercial Office Products Co. 8' In that case, the procedural issue was whether
a state equal employment opportunity agency's waiver of its exclusive sixty day
period for processing discrimination charges terminated the state agency's
proceedings.283 The EEOC assumed, in various "worksharing" agreements with
such state agencies, that the state agency's waiver of the sixty day period
terminated that agency's proceedings, permitting the EEOC immediately to deem
the charge filed with the EEOC and to begin processing it.2" The Supreme Court,
deferring to the EEOC's interpretation, agreed.285 Commercial Office seemed
unremarkable, both because it was consistent with the apparent policy of Gilbert
to give greater deference to the EEOC' s procedural as opposed to substantive rules,
and because it was consistent with the apparent policy behind the then-recent
Chevron decision to give greater deference to agency decisions generally.
Three years after Commercial Office, in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.2 86
("Aramco"), the Court refused to defer to the EEOC's policy applying Title VII
extraterritorially. 287 As in Gilbert, the Court gave only persuasive weight to the
EEOC's statutory interpretation of this substantive issue.285 Unlike the EEOC's
interpretation before the Court in Gilbert, however, the interpretation at issue in
Aramco did not derive from an "interpretive guideline. ' 289 Instead, the interpreta-
tion was expressed in a series of less formal documents, including a policy
statement, a decision by the EEOC, a letter from the EEOC's General Counsel, and
testimony by the EEOC's Chair.29
Summing up the above-described cases, it appears as though the post-Griggs
Court is guided by two basic principles. The first is that the Court will give the
280. See id. at 141 n.20.
281. See id. at 156-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
282. See486 U.S. 107, 112, 121-22 (1988).
283. See id. at 109-10.
284. See id. at 112.
285. See id. at 115-16 & 125-26 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
286. 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
287. See id. at 258.
288. See id.
289. See id. at 256-57.
290. See id.
EEOC substantially greater deference on procedural matters than on substantive
ones, at least with regard to rules issued under Title VII. This is consistent with
Congress' decision to give the EEOC only procedural rulemaking authority under
Title VII.29 The second, and concededly less-developed principle, is that the Court
apparently will give more deference to the EEOC's notice and comment rules than
it will to less formal types of policy pronouncements such as policy statements.
This is consistent with the Court's treatment of the policy pronouncements of other
agencies.2 92 Lower courts, however, do not appear to apply these principles
regularly, and their decisions concerning the degree of deference due to the EEOC
are inconsistent.2 93
E. EEOC Deference and the EEOC Policy Statement
The first principle-the substantive-procedural distinction-would augur a
strong judicial deference to the EEOC's Policy Statement on compulsory
employment arbitration. In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc.,294 the title case of the Mitsubishi Trilogy, and again in Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp. ,295 the Supreme Court stated that compulsory arbitration
agreements do not affect a party's statutory rights.2 96 Instead, such agreements,
according to the Court,29 7 merely change the procedures and the forum in which
those statutory rights are decided.298 Because the Court considers arbitration to be
a procedural issue rather than a substantive one, and because the Court gives
greater deference to the EEOC on procedural issues than substantive ones, the first
291. See supra notes 18-38 and accompanying text.
292. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204,213 (1988) (refusing to grant deference
to an agency interpretation expressed as a "litigating position" in an agency's brief); Robert A. Anthony,
Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 6-7 (1990).
But see Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 651-52 (1990) (upholding
interpretation announcement in advisory opinion); Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 490 U.S. 714, 725 (1989)
(same); Young v. Community Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 975-76 (1986) (upholding interpretation
announcement in informal adjudication).
293. See, e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1489 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that courts
may consider but are not bound by EEOC guidelines); Rowe v. Sullivan, 967 F.2d 186, 192-94 (5th Cir.
1992) (giving deference to EEOC's opinions); Vogel v. Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594, 598 (6th Cir. 1992)
(giving deference to EEOC interpretation of Civil Rights Act of 1991); Colgan v. Fisher Scientific Co.,
935 F.2d 1407, 1421 n. 11 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating that courts need not defer to the EEOC); Russell v.
Microdyne Corp., 830 F. Supp. 305,308 (E.D. Va. 1993) (giving EEOC guidelines limited deference),
rev'don other grounds, 65 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995).
294. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
295. 500 U.S. 20(1991).
296. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26; Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628.
297. For a contrary view, see Ware, supra note 74, at 725-27 (arguing that because of-the lax
standard by which courts review arbitration awards, arbitration agreements de facto privatize the
substantive law); Stephen J. Ware, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: Contracting Out of Government's
Role in Punishment and Federal Preemption of State Law, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 529, 541-42 (1994)
(same).
298. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628.
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principle indicates judicial deference.
The second principle-the distinction between notice and comment rules and
other less formal types of policy pronouncements-augurs less deference . 29 The
EEOC's Policy Statement on employment arbitration is similar in form to the
EEOC's policy statement on extraterritorial application of Title VII at issue in
Aramco. Because it is not a notice and comment rule, the Court is likely to give it
less deference.
The principles behind the Supreme Court's historical grant of deference to the
EEOC's statutory interpretations, therefore, sends mixed signals. It seems to
indicate that the EEOC's Policy Statement opposing compulsory arbitration is
entitled to some, though not a great deal of, deference. Moreover, as discussed
above, the EEOC lacks statutory authority to interpret the FAA, °° so it cannot so
much as venture an opinion on the interplay between the anti-discrimination
statutes and the FAA policy favoring arbitration. For these reasons, the EEOC's
Policy Statement is unlikely to be a strong factor in the ultimate determination of
the enforceability of compulsory employment arbitration agreements.
V. FLEXING THE EEOC's PROSECUTORIAL POWERS
The issuance of the Policy Statement is merely one mechanism by which the
EEOC has opposed compulsory employment arbitration. Another way that the
EEOC has done so is by using its prosecutorial powers, which it has done in two
ways. The first is by directly challenging compulsory employment arbitration
agreements in court, either by filing suit against employers on behalf of employees
who have signed these agreements, or by filing amicus briefs on behalf of
employees who have sued their employer on their own.3"' The second is by
litigating, in the EEOC's name, the underlying discrimination claims which
employees contractually have agreed to arbitrate. 2
299. For a thorough discussion of the degree of deference courts give to less formal agency
pronouncements, see Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals,
and the Like-Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1323-28
(1992).
300. See supra notes 261-66 and accompanying text.
301. See infra notes 303-23 and accompanying text.
302. See infra notes 324-438 and accompanying text.
A. Frontal Assaults on Arbitration Agreements
One way that the EEOC has used its prosecutorial powers to oppose
compulsory employment arbitration is by suing employers with the specific goal
of voiding the arbitration agreements which the employees have signed. For
example, in EEOC v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic ("ROID"),3 °3 the EEOC
sued an outpatient medical testing facility which had implemented a compulsory
employment arbitration policy. ROID's policy required employees to pay half the
cost of arbitration up front.3" It provided that employees could inform ROID of
their claims and initiate arbitration any time within one year of the occurrence of
the alleged wrongs; this provision, according to the court, had the potential to lull
employees into inaction and mislead them with respect to the EEOC's 300-day
filing deadline.3 °5 Although the policy's signature page stated that it was a
"Voluntary Agreement," a separate "Acknowledgment" page provided:
I acknowledge that I have been provided with a copy of ROID's policy on
Mandatory Arbitration. I understand that my continued employment with ROID
shall be deemed as evidence of my consent to abide by this policy. I further
understand that my refusal to sign this agreement shall be deemed a voluntary
termination initiated by the employee.3
6
ROID implemented its compulsory arbitration policy after two employees had
filed discrimination charges with the EEOC.3 °7 These employees were fired on the
spot when they refused to sign the arbitration agreement until after they had
consulted lawyers, despite the fact that a cover letter accompanying the agreement
recommended that employees consult a lawyer before signing the agreement.3 8
After a hearing, the court concluded that ROID's arbitration policy was
"misleading and against the principles of Title VII" and ."might constitute
retaliation against [the two] employees for making complaints to the EEOC."3°
303. 63 U.S.L.W. 2733 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
304. See id. For another case disapproving of requirements that employees contribute to the cost of
arbitration, see Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1483-86 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
305. See River Oaks Imaging, 63 U.S.L.W. at 2733.
306. See id.
307. See Federal Judge Issues Injunction Against Employment Arbitration Policy, 6 WORLD ARB.
& MEDIATION REP. 95, 95 (1995) ("Judge Norman Black found that the arbitration policy appeared to
be part of an effort by the employer to penalize or dismiss workers who had filed discrimination and
harassment complaints."); Boss Can't Force Staff to Sign an ADR Clause, Court Finds, Adopting the
EEOC's Argument, 13 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LmG. 76, 76 (1995) (noting that the EEOC
argued that "the company imposed the policy to get even with employees who complained of sexual
harassment and other discriminatory conduct").
308. See River Oaks Imaging, 63 U.S.L.W. at 2733.
309. See id.
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The Court, therefore, granted the EEOC's motion to enjoin ROID's operation of
the policy.31°
The ROID case represents a very effective use by the EEOC of its prosecuto-
rial powers. Unfortunately, as discussed in Part II of this article, the EEOC does
not have the financial resources to litigate many cases. 311 For this reason, the
EEOC has had to look for a less expensive way to persuade courts to void
compulsory employment arbitration agreements.
Instead of suing employers in its own name, the EEOC often files amicus
briefs in support of employees who have filed suit on their own. In recent years,
the EEOC has filed dozens of amicus briefs on behalf of employees who wish to
void a compulsory arbitration agreement that they have signed. 3 2 The typical case
parallels the following chronology: employee signs an arbitration agreement; a
dispute occurs, giving rise to an employment discrimination claim; employee files
a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, receives a right-to-sue letter, and later
files suit in federal court; employer moves to stay or dismiss the suit pending
arbitration; employee and the EEOC as amicus curiae ask the court to declare the
arbitration agreement unenforceable.
For example, in Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc.,3 13 an employee sued her
employer for, among other things, sex discrimination and sexual harassment under
Title VII. 3 14 After filing an EEOC charge, she sued her employer in federal
court.3 5 The employer, citing the FAA and a pre-dispute arbitration agreement that
plaintiff had signed, filed a motion to dismiss or stay and compel arbitration.316
Both the plaintiff, and the EEOC as amicus, opposed the motion, arguing that the
court should not enforce the arbitration agreement because the arbitration clause
at issue was not sufficiently specific to put the plaintiff on notice that it would
apply to employment disputes.317 The district court disagreed, and granted the
310. See id.
311. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
312. See, e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999); Rosenberg v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999); Shankle v. B-G Maintenance Mgmt.
of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 1999); Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir.
1998); Johnson v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 148 F.3d 373 (4th Cir. 1998); Seus v. John Nuveen & Co.,
Inc., 146 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1998); Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir.
1998); Miller v. Public Storage Mgmt., Inc., 121 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 1997); Gibson v. Neighborhood
Health Clinics, Inc., 121 F.3d 1126(7th Cir. 1997); Cosgrove v. Shearson Lehman Bros., No. 95-3432,
1997 WL 4783, at * 1 (6th Cir. 1997); Johnson v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1447 (D.
Minn. 1996).
313. 77 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 761 (E.D. Pa. 1997), aft'd, 146 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1998).
* 314. See id.
315. See id. at 763.
316. See id. at 764.
317. See id. at 765.
employer's motion.3 ' On appeal, the plaintiff and, again, the EEOC as amicus,
argued that Title VII should be interpreted as prohibiting compulsory employment
arbitration agreements.319 The Third Circuit disagreed and affirmed the district
court's ruling.320
Occasionally, the EEOC's amicus briefs appear to have some effect on a
court's decision. In Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co.,32' the EEOC's argument
that compulsory arbitration is inconsistent with Title VII was adopted by the Ninth
Circuit 322-- the only circuit that has taken this position to date.323 Indeed, EEOC
successes with its amicus briefs have been few and far between. Courts seldom
cite to the briefs, except to note that the EEOC has filed them, and courts more
often than not enforce the arbitration agreements over the EEOC's objection. It
does not appear, therefore, that the filing of amicus briefs has been a particularly
effective strategy for the EEOC.
B. Flanking Maneuvers
As discussed above, the EEOC has launched direct efforts to persuade courts
not to enforce compulsory employment arbitration agreements, both by filing suit
in its own name and by filing amicus briefs on behalf of employees who have sued
their employer in their own names. The EEOC has also taken a different approach;
it has filed suits in its own name on behalf of employees who have signed
employment arbitration agreements. The EEOC has sought the full array of
damages for the alleged discriminatory violations that the employees might have
sought had they sued on their own. This approach is different from the ROID
approach in that the EEOC does not directly challenge the enforceability of the
arbitration agreement against the employee. Instead, the EEOC argues that while
the arbitration agreement may be enforceable against the employee (thereby
precluding the employee from filing suit against the employer), the agreement is not
enforceable against the EEOC because the EEOC was not a signatory to the
agreement, and because the EEOC has independent statutory authority to sue
employers on behalf of employees. The EEOC argument is not that the arbitration
clause is void, but rather that it is irrelevant to any suit brought by the EEOC in its
own name.
318. See id. at 767.
319. See Seus, 146 F.3d at 183.
320. See id.
321. 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998).
322. See id. at 1189.
323. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
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1. Supreme Court Guidance
As discussed in Part III, the plaintiff in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp.32 argued that compulsory arbitration would undermine the role of the EEOC
in enforcing federal anti-discrimination laws because aggrieved employees would
not be required to file an EEOC charge before proceeding to arbitration.325 This,
the plaintiff argued, would effectively shut the EEOC out of the enforcement
process, in violation of the strong congressional policy of encouraging voluntary
conciliation of disputes between employer and employee with the EEOC as
intermediator.
26
The Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting that "[a]n individual ADEA
claimant subject to an arbitration agreement will still be free to file a charge with
the EEOC, even though the claimant is not able to institute a private judicial
action." '327 The Court further noted that the EEOC's role in fighting discrimination
is not dependent on individual employees filing a charge because the EEOC can
investigate claims of discrimination even when a charge is not filed.321 In other
words, the EEOC's investigatory authority is broader than the contents of an
aggrieved individual's charge of discrimination.329 The Court explained that
"arbitration agreements will not preclude the EEOC from bringing actions seeking
class-wide and equitable relief."33 Lower courts have interpreted the Gilmer
Court's discussion of the EEOC as confirming that the EEOC has independent
authority to investigate and conciliate an EEOC charge and to file suit should its
conciliation efforts fail.33' This interpretation is consistent with other judicial
decisions holding that the EEOC's authority to investigate and file suit is
324. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
325. See id. at 28.
326. See id. at 28-29.
327. See id. at 28.
328. See id.
329. Moreover, the filing ofan EEOC right-to-sue letter by the aggrieved employee is not necessarily
a prerequisite to arbitration, as it is with litigation. See BALES, supra note 4, at 158.
330. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32.
331. See U.S. EEOC v. Tire Kingdom, Inc., 80 F.3d 449, 451-52 (11 th Cir. 1996) (confirming the
EEOC's authority to conduct an investigation into alleged discrimination in the absence of a valid
charge of discrimination); EEOC v. American & Efird Mills, Inc., 964 F.2d 300, 301 (4th Cir. 1992)
(same); see also R. Gaull Silberman et al., Alternative Dispute Resolution of Employment
Discrimination Claims, 54 LA. L. REV. 1533, 1550 (1994) (stating that the EEOC has the power to
investigate and resolve any charge, and file suit if conciliation fails).
independent of an aggrieved employee's claim.332 For example, in General
Telephone Co. v. EEOC,333 the EEOC received complaints of sexual discrimination
from four General Telephone employees.334 The EEOC then sued General
Telephone, seeking injunctive relief and back pay for all women affected by
General Telephone's alleged discriminatory practices.335 General Telephone
moved to dismiss the suit based on the EEOC's failure to certify, under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23,336 the class for which the EEOC was seeking relief.337
The Supreme Court held that certification was unnecessary because the EEOC
was proceeding in its own name, pursuant to its own statutory authority to file suit,
and not merely on behalf of the employees.338 While securing relief for a group of
aggrieved individuals is a paramount purpose of the EEOC's statutory authority to
file suit, it is only one goal among others. 339 Another goal of the EEOC, the Court
stated, is to "implement the public interest" in obliterating all traces of employment
discrimination.34 ° Thus, like Gilmer, this case stands for the proposition that the
EEOC has the authority to litigate employment discrimination claims on its own,
and that this authority is independent of the right that employees have to file suit
on their own behalf.
2. Analogous Cases From the Circuits
a. The EEOC's Right to Sue
When the EEOC sues an employer seeking relief on behalf of employees who
have signed arbitration agreements, the employer usually argues that it is unfair for
courts to allow the EEOC to litigate on behalf of employees who have contractually
332. In addition to the cases cited in the text, see also EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., L'Oreal Hair Care Div.,
821 F.2d 1085, 1090 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that an employee's waiver of the right to file a charge with
the EEOC is void as against public policy); EEOC v. Astra U.S.A., Inc., 929 F. Supp. 512, 521 (D.
Mass.) (granting the EEOC's request for a preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of
provisions in settlement agreements that prohibited the employees from filing EEOC charges or
assisting the EEOC in any investigation), affd in part, vacated in part, 94 F.3d 738 (1st Cir. 1996).
333. 446 U.S. 318 (1980).
334. See id. at 320.
335. See id. at 321.
336. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 permits
[o]ne or more members of a class [to] sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all
[members of the class] only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4)
the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
FED. R. Ctv. P. 23(a).
337. See General Telephone, 446 U.S. at 321-22.
338. See id. at 333-34.
339. See id. at 324.
340. See id. at 326.
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agreed to arbitrate. Analogous situations occur when the EEOC sues an employer
on behalf of employees who have settled or already litigated their individual claims
against the employer. Again, the employer argues that it is unfair for the EEOC to
litigate issues that have already been resolved.
Notwithstanding this argument, courts have confirmed the EEOC's independ-
ent authority to sue in situations where the aggrieved employees have settled or
already litigated their complaints against the employer. For example, in EEOC v.
McLean Trucking Co.,34" ' Allen Brown, Jr., an African-American truck driver
employed by McLean, filed an EEOC charge alleging that McLean's "no transfer
rule" discriminated against him and other African-American drivers. 42 While his
EEOC charge was pending, Brown filed a grievance pursuant to a collective
bargaining agreement between McLean and Brown's union." Before Brown's
grievance was arbitrated, Brown asked the EEOC to withdraw his charge.3' The
EEOC, however, refused to grant its consent to withdraw."4 In July 1971, Brown's
grievance was arbitrated, and he was awarded part of the relief that he had
requested.?
In March 1972, the EEOC found reasonable cause to believe that McLean's
transfer policies violated Title VII and that McLean was maintaining racially
segregated job classifications. 7 In July 1972, Brown filed a Title VII lawsuit
against McLean based on essentially the same allegations." Two months later, the
EEOC filed an additional suit against McLean, again alleging racial discrimination
in McLean's transfer policies and job classifications. 9
In October 1973, Brown voluntarily dismissed his lawsuit against McLean
pursuant to a compromise settlement between him and McLean.35 ° McLean then
moved to dismiss the EEOC's lawsuit, arguing among other things that Brown's
acceptance of the arbitration award and settlement of his individual Title VII suit
against McLean mooted the EEOC's suit.351 The district court agreed and
dismissed the EEOC's suit.352
341. 525 F.2d 1007 (6th Cir. 1975).
342. See id. at 1008.
343. See id.
344. See id. at 1008-09.
345. See id. at 1009. The Code of Federal Regulations permits an aggrieved person to withdraw his
or her EEOC charge only with the consent of the EEOC. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.10.
346. See McLean, 525 F.2d at 1009.
347. See id.
348. See id.
349. See id.
350. See id. at 1009 n.4.
351. See id.
352. See id. at 1009-10.
On appeal, the EEOC argued that neither Brown's acceptance of the arbitration
award nor the settlement of his suit precluded the EEOC from bringing an action
in the public interest to eliminate discriminatory practices uncovered during the
EEOC's investigation of Brown's discrimination charge.353 The Sixth Circuit
agreed, concluding that the "'EEOC sues to vindicate the public interest, which is
broader than the interests of the charging parties, and that [the] EEOC is not barred
by the doctrine of resjudicata from basing its complaint on charges of discrimina-
tion which it never agreed to settle.'
' 354
The Ninth Circuit reached the same conclusion in EEOC v. Goodyear
Aerospace Corp.355 In that case, Marshaline Pettigrew filed a charge with the
EEOC, alleging that Goodyear had failed to promote her because of her race.356
After the EEOC sued Goodyear, Pettigrew and Goodyear signed a settlement
agreement in which Goodyear gave her the promotion in return for her signing a
release and her requesting that the EEOC dismiss its lawsuit against Goodyear.357
The EEOC nonetheless refused to voluntarily dismiss its lawsuit.358 Goodyear then
requested that the trial court dismiss the lawsuit, arguing that the settlement mooted
the EEOC's suit.359 The trial court agreed and dismissed the EEOC's case. 360 The
Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Pettigrew's settlement did not moot the
EEOC's right to seek injunctive relief to protect employees as a class, and to deter
Goodyear from discrimination. 36' The court explained that "Goodyear's argument
erroneously assumes that the EEOC's [lawsuit] is merely a representative suit, and
not one to vindicate public interests. 362
Similarly, in EEOC v. United Parcel Service,3 63 Jerome Patterson, a package
delivery driver for UPS, challenged UPS' policy that employees with beards could
not hold jobs in positions involving public contact.36 Patterson suffered from a
skin condition that affects approximately twenty-five percent of the African-
American male population; the sole treatment for this condition is to refrain from
shaving. 65 When UPS informed Patterson that he would be transferred to a lower-
paying, non-public contact position if he did not shave, Patterson filed a charge
with the EEOC.3 6 The EEOC brought suit against UPS on behalf of Patterson and
353. See id. at 1010.
354. See id. (quoting EEOC v. Kimberley-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352 (6th Cir. 1975)).
355. 813 F.2d 1539 (9th Cir. 1987).
356. See id. at 1541.
357. See id. at 1541-42.
358. See id. at 1542.
359. See id.
360. See id.
361. See id. at 1543.
362. See id. at 1542.
363. 860 F.2d 372 (10th Cir. 1988).
364. See id. at 373.
365. See id.
366. See id.
42
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other similarly situated African-American males.367 After Patterson settled with
UPS, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of UPS on the EEOC
suit, concluding that the EEOC lacked standing because it could not present an
actual injured party to the court.3 68 The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the
EEOC's right to proceed with its suit was not dependent on its production of an
injured party; this right "endure[s] until the alleged discrimination [is]
eradicated."369
Other courts have held that the EEOC's right to sue an employer for violation
of Title VII is independent of an aggrieved employee's right to bring such a suit.37°
These cases, together with the Supreme Court's discussion of the issue in Gilmer
v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,371 strongly suggest that an employee's signing
of a compulsory employment arbitration agreement will neither affect the
employee's right to file a charge with the EEOC, nor the EEOC's right to
investigate the charge and, upon a finding of discrimination, to sue the employer.
b. The Availability of Relief
Although the settlement cases discussed above indicate that the EEOC's right
to sue an employer will not be affected by an aggrieved employee having signed
a pre-dispute arbitration agreement, the existence of such an agreement may limit
the types of relief that the EEOC is entitled to seek. This is particularly true if the
arbitration agreement results in an arbitration award being rendered before the
resolution of the EEOC' s lawsuit. In both McLean and Goodyear, in which the
aggrieved employees had settled their claims against the company before the
conclusion of the EEOC's litigation, the courts held that the prior private
settlements limited the scope of relief that the EEOC could seek on behalf of the
367. See id.
368. See id. at 374.
369. See id. at 377.
370. See, e.g., EEOC v. G-K-G, Inc., 39 F.3d 740, 744-45 (7th Cir. 1994) (refusing to dismiss an
EEOC suit as duplicative to a suit brought by an aggrieved former employee); EEOC v. Wackenhut
Corp., 939 F.2d 241, 242-43 (5th Cir. 1991) (same); New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. EEOC, 680 F.2d 23,
25 (5th Cir. 1982); see also Secretary of Labor v. Fitzsimmons, 805 F.2d 682, 694 (7th Cir. 1986)
(holding that government actions to enforce ERISA are not barred under res judicata principles by
private ERISA litigation); Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1462 (5th Cir. 1983) (same);
United States v. Massachusetts Maritime Academy, 762 F.2d 142, 151-52 (1st Cir. 1985) (holding that
the mootness of the complainant's claim in a Title IX action did not moot the Attorney General's right
to continue the suit against the maritime academy for sex discrimination in student recruitment and
admissions); but cf EEOC v. Harvey L. Walner& Assoc., 91 F.3d 963, 971 (7th Cir. 1996) (dismissing
a suit filed by the EEOC because the EEOC had consented to the aggrieved employee's withdrawal of
his charge).
371. 500 U.S. 20(1991).
settling employees.372 The Sixth and Ninth Circuits held, respectively, that the
settling employees were not entitled, via the EEOC suit, to recover any "private
benefits," such as back pay, not granted to them in their settlements.37 3 The EEOC
was thus restricted to seeking classwide and injunctive relief.
Other courts have ruled similarly. For example, in EEOC v. U.S. Steel
Corp.,3 7 4 the EEOC filed a complaint alleging that U.S. Steel had violated the
ADEA by requiring that its employees execute a release as a condition for
obtaining a generous pension.375 Earlier, several employees unsuccessfully had
brought individual suits on the same claim.3 76 The district court ruled for the
EEOC and enjoined U.S. Steel from requiring the release.377 The district court also
ruled that the earlierjudgments did not preclude retroactive relief for the employees
who had sued and lost.
378
The Third Circuit reversed. Without considering whether the EEOC had the
authority to seek the injunctive relief,379 the court held that the employees who had
fully litigated their own claims were precluded by res judicata from obtaining
individual relief in the subsequent EEOC action based on the same claims. 380 The
court reasoned that Congress intended that the EEOC serve as the individual
employee's representative when it seeks to recover individual benefits for him,3s'
and that "when the EEOC seeks to represent grievants by attempting to obtain
private benefits on their behalf, the doctrine of representative claim preclusion must
be applied."'3 82
Similarly, in EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc.,383 Donald Rosenthal sued his
employer for, among other things, age discrimination.38 4 The EEOC subsequently
filed suit on the same claim, requesting an injunction prohibiting the employer from
"engaging in any employment practice which discriminates because of age... ..""
The employer moved for summary judgment in Rosenthal's individual case on
statute of limitations grounds, and the district court granted the motion. 386 The
372. See supra notes 341-62 and accompanying text.
373. See Goodyear, 813 F.2d at 1543; McLean, 525 F.2d at 1011; see also EEOCv. Astra U.S.A.,
Inc., 929 F. Supp. 512, 521 (D. Mass.), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 94 F.3d 738 (1st Cir. 1996)
(stating in dicta that an employee may, in a settlement agreement, "waive the right to recover damages
both in his or her own lawsuit and in a lawsuit brought by the EEOC on the employee's behalf").
374. 921 F.2d 489 (3d Cir. 1990).
375. See id. at 490.
376. See id. at 491.
377. See id.
378. See id. at 492.
379. See id.
380. See id. at 495.
381. See id. at 494-95.
382. Id. at 496.
383. 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir. 1993).
384. See id. at 1287-88.
385. See id. at 1288, 1291.
386. See id. at 1288.
[Vol. 27: 1, 1999] Employment Arbitration
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
employer then moved for summary judgment in the EEOC case on res judicata
grounds.387 The district court, relying on the Third Circuit's U.S. Steel decision,
granted the motion.38 Acknowledging that the EEOC's interest in pursuing a
discrimination claim "may be broader than that of an individual for whose benefit
the EEOC initiated its investigation," the court nonetheless dismissed the EEOC's
suit because it did not "allege a single incident of discrimination against any
employee other than Rosenthal."38 9
The Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court that Rosenthal's individual
suit barred the EEOC from recovering backpay, liquidated damages, or reinstate-
ment on his behalf.3" However, it reversed the decision insofar as the district court
held that the EEOC could not seek an injunction against further violation,
concluding that "[t]here is no privity such that resjudicata as to Rosenthal's claim
for individual relief would bar the EEOC from bringing an action seeking an
injunction.., in order to prevent further violations."39'
3. Recent Cases Involving Arbitration Agreements
If courts treat arbitration cases consistently with the cases discussed above, the
fact that an employee has signed an arbitration agreement with an employer will
limit the EEOC's ability to obtain relief that the employee might otherwise have
obtained on her own, but will not limit the EEOC's ability to obtain injunctive
relief against future violations or relief for other aggrieved employees. To date,
there are only three cases on point. The Second and Fourth Circuits and the
District Court for the District of Maryland have held that the EEOC may not seek
monetary relief on behalf of employees who have signed arbitration agreements,
but may seek classwide injunctive relief.3 92 The Sixth Circuit, however, has held
that there is no limitation on the types of relief that the EEOC may seek.393
In EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co.," the EEOC brought an age discrimina-
tion suit against Kidder seeking back pay, liquidated damages, and reinstatement
on behalf of nine395 former investment bankers.396 All nine of the former
387. See id.
388. See id. at 1288-89.
389. See id. at 1289.
390. See id. at 1291.
391. See id.
392. See infra notes 394-419 and accompanying text.
393. See infra notes 420-37 and accompanying text.
394. 156 F.3d 298 (2d Cir. 1998).
395. The EEOC initially brought suit on behalf of seventeen former employees, but for reasons that
are not explained in the circuit court opinion, that number later dropped to nine. See id. at 300.
396. See id.
employees had signed arbitration agreements; three of them arbitrated their claims
while the EEOC suit was pending and lost. Meanwhile, Kidder discontinued its
investment banking operations, after which the EEOC withdrew its request for
injunctive relief.397 Kidder then moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that the
arbitration agreements precluded the EEOC's pursuit of monetary damages on
behalf of the nine former employees.398 The district court agreed.3
The Second Circuit affirmed. Citing Goodyear, Harris Chernin, and U.S.
Steel for the proposition "that the EEOC may not seek monetary relief in the name
of an employee who has waived, settled, or previously litigated the claim,"' the
court reasoned that this analysis was equally applicable when an employee had
agreed to arbitrate the claim.4"' To rule otherwise, the court concluded, would
permit an employee who previously agreed to arbitrate her claim "to make an end
run around the arbitration agreement by having the EEOC pursue back pay or
liquidated damages on his or her behalf."' '
In EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.," 3 Eric Baker signed an employment
application, which contained an arbitration provision, with Waffle House.'
Shortly after he began working, he suffered two seizures and was subsequently
fired. 5 Baker filed a charge with the EEOC, claiming that his discharge violated
the ADA.4°6 The EEOC sued Waffle House and sought, among other things, a
permanent injunction prohibiting Waffle House from discriminating on the basis
of disability, and an award of reinstatement, backpay, and compensatory and
punitive damages for Baker.' °
Waffle House moved to compel arbitration and to either stay or dismiss the
EEOC suit.4 8 The magistrate recommended that the EEOC be "required to
arbitrate the claims it filed on behalf of Baker."''9 The district court disagreed,
concluding that the arbitration provision was not applicable.410 The Fourth Circuit,
expressly agreeing with the approach taken by the Second Circuit in Kidder,4" '
stated:
When the EEOC seeks 'make-whole' relief for a charging party, the federal
policy favoring enforcement of private arbitration agreements outweighs the
397. See id.
398. See id.
399. See id.
400. See id. at 301-02.
401. See id. at 302.
402. See id. at 303.
403. 193 F.3d 805 (4th Cir. 1999).
404. See id. at 807.
405. See id.
406. See id.
407. See id. at 807-08.
408. See id. at 808.
409. See id.
410. See id.
411. Seeid. at812.
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EEOC's right to proceed in federal court because in that circumstance, the EEOC's
public interest is minimal, as the EEOC seeks primarily to vindicate private, rather
than public, interests. On the other hand, when the EEOC is pursuing large-scale
injunctive relief, the balance tips in favor of EEOC enforcement efforts in federal
court because the public interest dominates the EEOC's action. 12
The court concluded as follows:
(1) that the EEOC cannot be compelled, by reason of an arbitration agreement
between the charging party and his employer, to arbitrate claims, but (2) that, to the
extent that the EEOC seeks to obtain 'make-whole' relief on behalf of a charging
party who is subject to an arbitration agreement, it is precluded from seeking such
relief in a judicial forum. 4 13
The court, therefore, dismissed the EEOC's claims on behalf of Baker individually,
but permitted the EEOC to move forward on its claims for broad injunctive
relief. 14
The District Court for the District of Maryland reached a similar conclusion
in EEOC v. World Savings & Loan Association, Inc. 15 In that case, the EEOC
sought general injunctive relief against World Savings for alleged Title VII
violations as well as monetary damages on behalf of two former employees.
16
Each of the employees previously signed a pre-dispute arbitration agreement,417 but
apparently decided neither to arbitrate nor to litigate claims on their own behalf"' s
Like the Second Circuit in Kidder, the Maryland district court found the settlement
cases analogous to arbitration cases, and held that the EEOC was limited to seeking
class-based equitable relief.419
The Sixth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in EEOC v. Frank's
Nursery & Crafts, Inc.42 In Frank's, Carol Adams complained to the EEOC that
Frank's denied her a promotion because of her race.42' Similar to the employees
412. Id.
413. Id. at 807.
414. Seeid. at813.
415. 32 F. Supp. 2d 833, 836 (D. Md. 1999).
416. See id. at 834.
417. See id.
418. See id. at 836.
419. See id. at 835-36. The court dismissed the case with prejudice to facilitate immediate appellate
review of its decision to deny the EEOC the authority to seek monetary damages. The court also gave
the EEOC the option of prosecuting the suit for class-based equitable relief only. In this event, the
EEOC could seek review of the court's order concerning monetary damages after final judgment on its
claim for equitable relief. See id. at 836.
420. 177 F.3d 448 (6th Cir. 1999).
421. Seeid.at453.
in World Savings & Loan and six of the nine employees in Kidder, Adams elected
not to pursue her individual claims on her own.422 Instead, the EEOC filed suit
against Frank's, requesting both classwide equitable relief and an order requiring
Frank's to "make [Adams] whole" with backpay, compensatory, and punitive
damages.42 3 Frank's moved to compel arbitration and for summary judgment based
on an arbitration agreement contained in Adams' employment application.424 The
district court granted the motion and dismissed the suit in its entirety,425 holding
that "to the extent that Adams is bound by her agreement to arbitrate, so is the
EEOC." '426 The court reasoned that "[t]o decide otherwise would render agree-
ments to arbitrate voidable at the whim of the EEOC. 427
The Sixth Circuit reversed. First, the court held that the district court's
dismissal of the EEOC's claim for monetary relief was inconsistent with the 1972
amendments to Title VII128 giving the EEOC unilateral authority to exercise its
prosecutorial powers by filing suit.429
Congress granted to the EEOC the right to represent an interest broader than
that of a particular individual when it exercises its authority to sue. To empower
a private individual to take away this congressional mandate, by entering into
arbitration agreements or other contractual arrangements, would grant that
individual the ability to govern whether and when the EEOC may protect the public
interest and further our national initiative against employment discrimination, and
to thereby undo the work of Congress in its 1972 amendments.43°
Second, the court held that because the EEOC was not a party to Adams'
agreement to arbitrate, it could not be bound by that agreement.43' Moreover, the
court reasoned that the Mitsubishi presumption of arbitrability is effectively
rebutted by the statutory language giving the EEOC the unilateral authority to
sue.432 Thus, an employee signing an arbitration agreement should have no effect
on the EEOC's ability to sue for any relief authorized by the anti-discrimination
statutes.433
Third, the court held that neither resjudicata nor waiver principles barred the
EEOC from seeking monetary relief because Adams had not settled or arbitrated
her claims.434 Finally, the court concluded that "our interest in protecting, as a
422. See id. at 453, 460 n.7, 469 (Nelson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
423. See id. at 453.
424. See id.
425. See id.
426. See EEOC v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 500, 505 (E.D. Mich. 1997), rev'd,
177 F.3d 448 (6th Cir. 1999).
427. See id.
428. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
429. See Frank's, 117 F.3d at 467.
430. Id. at 459.
431. See id. at 459-62.
432. See id. at461.
433. See id.
434. See id. at 462-67.
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matter of public policy, the EEOC's power to guide the course of every Title VII
action outweighs the interest in enforcing Adams' private promise to arbitrate
against the EEOC."435
Judge Nelson agreed with the majority that the district court erred by
dismissing the EEOC's claims for.classwide injunctive relief, but dissented with
respect to the monetary damages issue.436 Quoting the Second Circuit's Kidder
decision, Judge Nelson concluded that permitting the EEOC to pursue injunctive
relief in federal court while relegating claims for individual relief to arbitration
"strikes the right balance" between the FAA policy favoring arbitration and
Title VIl's grant of prosecutorial authority to the EEOC.437
4. Analysis
Both the Frank's majority and Judge Nelson accurately frame the policy issue;
they simply reach different conclusions as to how it should be resolved. On the
one hand, the 1972 amendments to Title VII give the EEOC the authority to sue
employers not only for classwide relief and prospective injunctive relief, but also
for monetary damages on behalf of aggrieved individuals. There is no express or
implied restriction in the text of Title VII that limits the EEOC's authority to do so
when an employee has agreed to arbitrate, or for that matter settle, her individual
claims. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has, since the Mitsubishi Trilogy,
interpreted the FAA as embodying a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements, ' 438 and permitting the EEOC to litigate claims for monetary relief on
behalf of employees who have agreed to arbitrate their claims seems inconsistent
with this policy.
While I agree with Judge Nelson's conclusion, I would arrive at the same
conclusion by means of a somewhat different approach. An employee settlement
or the signing of an arbitration clause does not take away the EEOC's statutory
authority to sue. Instead, it merely provides the employer with a defense to
liability. If, for example, the individual employee had arbitrated her claim, won,
and recovered backpay damages, surely the courts would not permit the EEOC to
sue the employer on behalf of the employee for backpay damages. To do so would
constitute an extra-statutory penalty on the employer and a windfall to the
employee. The employee has received what she is entitled to and anything more
would unjustly enrich her and unjustly penalize the employer.
435. Seeid.at461.
436. See id. at 468-71 (Nelson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
437. See id. at 471 (quoting EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298 (2d Cir. 1998)).
438. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
The same rule should apply if the employee took her case to arbitration and
lost on the merits. Permitting the EEOC to litigate on behalf of an employee under
these circumstances gives the employee two bites at the same apple, one through
her own individual case and one through the EEOC. It would also require the
employer to litigate the same case twice, once in arbitration and again in litigation
brought by the EEOC. Under these circumstances, it makes sense to apply the
principles of resjudicata to preclude the EEOC from seeking the same relief that
the employee already has sought.
I see no reason to apply a different rule when an employee has failed, for
whatever reason, to pursue her claim in arbitration. To allow the EEOC to litigate
on behalf of an employee who has agreed, but failed, to arbitrate would discourage
employees from arbitrating. This result is directly contrary to the Supreme Court's
strong policy favoring arbitration.
If, however, the EEOC is seeking classwide injunctive relief or relief on behalf
of other employees, the EEOC suit should be permitted to go forward. This would
not affect the general principle that the EEOC should not be allowed to litigate a
claim or pursue damages on behalf of an individual who signed an arbitration
agreement and either did or could have arbitrated the claim for damages.
VI. CONCLUSION
The EEOC has opposed compulsory employment arbitration agreements in
several different ways. First, it promulgated a Policy Statement declaring that
courts should not enforce such agreements because the agreements usurp the
judicial role of interpreting and applying the federal anti-discrimination laws.
However, courts have already squarely held that these agreements are consistent
with, and therefore are enforceable, under the anti-discrimination laws. Moreover,
the EEOC lacks statutory authority to interpret the FAA, the statute which the
Supreme Court has used as the basis for enforcing arbitration agreements. For
these reasons, it is unlikely that courts will adopt the EEOC's position that
employment arbitration agreements are unenforceable.
Second, the EEOC has opposed employment arbitration by suing employers
to obtain a court order declaring the agreements unenforceable. However, because
the agency's resources are limited, it is able to take this approach in only a small
number of cases. Recently, the agency has sought to accomplish the same thing by
filing amicus briefs in cases brought by aggrieved employees. It does not appear
that the EEOC has had appreciable success using this approach.
Third, the EEOC has sued employers in its own name on behalf of employees
who have signed arbitration agreements. The EEOC has sought the full array of
damages similar to those which the employees might have pursued had they
brought the action on their own. Courts have given this approach a mixed
reception because it effectively allows the EEOC to circumvent the arbitration
agreement that the aggrieved employee has signed. This Article argues that courts
should not permit the EEOC to litigate a claim on behalf of an individual who has
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signed an arbitration agreement and either did or could have arbitrated the claim.
An arbitration agreement should not, however, preclude the EEOC from seeking
classwide injunctive relief or relief on behalf of other employees.

